Chinese Room Argument

2012 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument

scholarly journals Chinese room argument

Scholarpedia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 3100 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Searle
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument

A cognitive analysis of the Chinese room argument

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Y. Teng
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Room ◽  
Cognitive Analysis ◽  
Chinese Room Argument

Searle, John (1932–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Rust
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Social Ontology ◽  
Illocutionary Force ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
In Virtue Of

John Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932) is the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. This analytic philosopher has made major contributions to the fields of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and social ontology. He is best known for his Chinese room argument, which aims to demonstrate that the formally described systems of computer functionalism cannot give rise to intentional understanding. Searle’s early work focused on the philosophy of language, where, in Speech Acts (1969), he explores the hypothesis that speaking a language is a rule-governed form of behavior. Just as one must follow certain rules in order to be considered to be playing chess, rules determine whether a speaker is making a promise, giving a command, asking a question, making a statement, and so forth. The kind of speech act that an utterance is depends on, among other conditions, its propositional content and illocutionary force. The content depicts the world as being a certain way, and the force specifies what a speaker is trying to do with that content. For example, for an utterance to qualify as a promise a speaker must describe a future act (content) and intend that the utterance place him or herself under an obligation to do that act (force). In Intentionality (1983), Searle argues that the structure of language not only mirrors but is derivative of the structure of intentional thought, so that core elements of his analysis of speech acts can be used as the basis for a theory of intentionality. Just as we can only promise by bringing certain propositional contents under a certain illocutionary force, intentional states such as belief, desire, fear, and joy can only be about the world in virtue of a representative content and a psychological mode. A theory of intentionality does not explain how intentionality is possible, given the basic facts of the world as identified by the natural sciences. Much of Searle’s work in the philosophy of mind, as found in Minds, Brains, and Science (1984) and The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), is dedicated to the question of how mental facts, including but not limited to intentional facts, can be reconciled with basic, natural facts. Searle’s Chinese room argument is formulated in the service of rejecting computer functionalism, a prominent attempt at such reconciliation. Searle’s positive view, which he describes as "biological naturalism," is that mental facts are both caused by and features of underlying neurophysiological processes. In Speech Acts (1969), Searle claims that using language is akin to playing chess, in that both activities are made possible by participants following what he describes as "constitutive rules," rules that must be followed in order for someone to be considered to be undertaking those activities. Other institutional facts, such as money or the U.S. presidency, are also created and maintained in virtue of our following certain constitutive rules. For example, someone can only count as a U.S. president if that person is, among other conditions, a U.S. citizen who receives a majority of electoral votes. This thought is extended and explored in Searle’s two book-length contributions to the field of social ontology, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010). In addition to the philosophy of language and social ontology, Searle has made book-length contributions to the philosophy of action (Rationality in Action (2001)) and the philosophy of perception (Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception (2015)). He also famously engaged Jacques Derrida’s critique of J. L. Austin’s discussion of illocutionary acts ("Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida" (1977)). Searle has summarized his various positions in Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998) and Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004).

Searle and the Chinese Room Argument

2011 ◽  
pp. 334-336
Author(s):  
Leslie Burkholder
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument

Looking to the Future

2019 ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Inorganic Matter ◽  
The Future

This chapter considers the question of whether or not nonliving systems can acquire consciousness. It explores contemporary advances in technology, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. The chapter also considers whether or not consciousness can be performed if inorganic matter replaced the components with which organisms experience consciousness. These and similar questions on nonhuman intelligence and consciousness are fleshed out with scenarios and thought experiments proposed throughout the 20th century, such as John Searle’s Chinese room argument and the archangel paradigm proposed by C. D. Broad. The chapter concludes with reflections on the human being’s inability to truly experience consciousness in the same way as nonhumans.

Chinese room argument

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Van Gulick
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Strong Ai

John Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ argument aims to refute ‘strong AI’ (artificial intelligence), the view that instantiating a computer program is sufficient for having contentful mental states. Imagine a program that produces conversationally appropriate Chinese responses to Chinese utterances. Suppose Searle, who understands no Chinese, sits in a room and is passed slips of paper bearing strings of shapes which, unbeknown to him, are Chinese sentences. Searle performs the formal manipulations of the program and passes back slips bearing conversationally appropriate Chinese responses. Searle seems to instantiate the program, but understands no Chinese. So, Searle concludes, strong AI is false.

scholarly journals Chinese room and program identity

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
The Other ◽  
John Searle ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Strong Conclusion ◽  
Famous Argument ◽  
Present Argument

The Chinese room argument is famous argument introduced by John Searle, in which Searle presented various problems with the claim that it is possible for the artificial intelligence to have understanding of a language in a way in which intelligent beings such as humans have that capacity. The argument was influential enough to, in decades following it, sparke numerous responses and critiques, along with a few alleged improvements to it from Searle. In this article, I will analyze one atypical critique of Searle?s argument, made by Mark Sprevak. Sprevak, unlike the other critics of the argument, agrees with Searle that understanding does not exist in Chinese room in any way, but he claims that Chinese room cannot execute every possible program, like Searle claims. Because of that, Searle cannot conclude the strong conclusion he wants from The Chinese room argument. In this article, I will analyze Searle?s argument, I will give a brief overview of typical responses to it, and I will analyze Sprevak?s response. In the last section, I will present argument that shows that Sprevak, if he wants to keep his conclusions, must either give up one part of his response, or accept one of the typical responses to Searle?s argument, thus making his own response dependent on the response from others.

scholarly journals Robots, intencionalidade e inteligência artificial

1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (0) ◽  
pp. 109-121
Author(s):  
João de Fernandes Teixeira
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument

O artigo aborda problemas filosóficos relativos à natureza da intencionalidade e da representação mental. A primeira parte apresenta um breve histórico dos problemas, percorrendo rapidamente alguns episódios da filosofia clássica e da filosofia contemporânea. A segunda parte examina o Chinese Room Argument (Argumento do Quarto do Chinês) formulado por J. Searle. A terceira parte desenvolve alguns argumentos visando mostrar a inadequação do modelo funcionalista de mente na construção de robots. A conclusão (quarta parte) aponta algumas alternativas ao modelo funcionalista tradicional, como, por exemplo, o conexionismo.

Artificial Life and the Chinese Room Argument

2002 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-378
Author(s):  
David Anderson ◽  
B. Jack Copeland
Keyword(s):  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Artificial Life ◽  
Life Form ◽  
Chinese Room ◽  
Chinese Room Argument ◽  
Strong Ai ◽  
Do So

“Strong artificial life” refers to the thesis that a sufficiently sophisticated computer simulation of a life form is a life form in its own right. Can John Searle's Chinese room argument [12]—originally intended by him to show that the thesis he dubs “strong AI” is false—be deployed against strong ALife? We have often encountered the suggestion that it can be (even in print; see Harnad [8]). We do our best to transfer the argument from the domain of AI to that of ALife. We do so in order to show once and for all that the Chinese room argument proves nothing about ALife. There may indeed be powerful philosophical objections to the thesis of strong ALife, but the Chinese room argument is not among them.

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