EUTHANASIA AND ISLAMIC RULINGS PERTINENT TO MAINTAINING AND REMOVING ARTIFICIAL LIFE SUPPORT DEVICES

This paper is intended to elaborate on the legal ruling of removing life support from a brain-dead person. Brain death means the permanent absence of brainstem and cerebral functions, not only the death of the brain cortex. Life support devices restore the functions of the heart and respiratory system, which sometimes result in the full recovery of consciousness of the patient and all of his basic functions. It is possible for the patient to restore normal breathing and leave the hospital in a full healthy state. On this basis, it is not permissible for a doctor to remove these devices before the brainstem dies, otherwise this would cause a real and irreversible death of the patient. In this case, the doctor bears full civil and criminal responsibility. The doctor is held accountable if he refrains from providing assistance to this patient who is legally and medically alive. It is permissible to remove artificial life devices once the death of the brain is ascertained in the light of the above-mentioned diagnoses. Then, the patient will be transferred to another room, but his death is announced only after the heart stops functioning. It is from this moment that the rulings of death are applied. The responsibility of removing these devices and declaring death is the work of a specialized medical committee that approves the diagnosis and issues a burial permit.

Intelligence as Information Processing: Brains, Swarms, and Computers

There is no agreed definition of intelligence, so it is problematic to simply ask whether brains, swarms, computers, or other systems are intelligent or not. To compare the potential intelligence exhibited by different cognitive systems, I use the common approach used by artificial intelligence and artificial life: Instead of studying the substrate of systems, let us focus on their organization. This organization can be measured with information. Thus, I apply an informationist epistemology to describe cognitive systems, including brains and computers. This allows me to frame the usefulness and limitations of the brain-computer analogy in different contexts. I also use this perspective to discuss the evolution and ecology of intelligence.

Comprehensive assessment of a nationwide simulation-based course for artificial life support

Background Successful implementation of medical technologies applied in life-threatening conditions, including extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) requires appropriate preparation and training of medical personnel. The pandemic has accelerated the creation of new ECMO centers and has highlighted continuous training in adapting to new pandemic standards. To reach high standards of patients’ care, we created the first of its kind, National Education Centre for Artificial Life Support (NEC-ALS) in 40 million inhabitants’ country in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The role of the Center is to test and promote the novel or commonly used procedures as well as to develop staff skills on management of patients needing ECMO. Method In 2020, nine approved and endorsed by ELSO courses of “Artificial Life Support with ECMO” were organized. Physicians participated in the three-day high-fidelity simulation-based training that was adapted to abide by the social distancing norms of the COVID-19 pandemic. Knowledge as well as crucial cognitive, behavioral and technical aspects (on a 5-point Likert scale) of management on ECMO were assessed before and after course completion. Moreover, the results of training in mechanical chest compression were also evaluated. Results There were 115 participants (60% men) predominantly in the age of 30–40 years. Majority of them (63%) were anesthesiologists or intensivists with more than 5-year clinical experience, but 54% had no previous ECMO experience. There was significant improvement after the course in all cognitive, behavioral, and technical self-assessments. Among aspects of management with ECMO that all increased significantly following the course, the most pronounced was related to the technical one (from approximately 1.0 to more 4.0 points). Knowledge scores significantly increased post-course from 11.4 ± SD to 13 ± SD (out of 15 points). The quality of manual chest compression relatively poor before course improved significantly after training. Conclusions Our course confirmed that simulation as an educational approach is invaluable not only in training and testing of novel or commonly used procedures, skills upgrading, but also in practicing very rare cases. The implementation of the education program during COVID-19 pandemic may be helpful in founding specialized Advanced Life Support centers and teams including mobile ones. The dedicated R&D Innovation Ecosystem established in the “ECMO for Greater Poland” program, with developed National Education Center can play a crucial role in the knowledge and know-how transfer but future research is needed.

The Contemporary Art of the Nature Morte in the Age of Artificial Life Forms: The Metafictional Illusion of Life in Installation Art and Jeanette Winterson’s Frankissstein

Observing the artistic response to the illusional nature of artificial life forms in the field of installation art, contemporary writers often allude to conceptual artworks through ekphrastic means to “grasp the texture of the contemporary real” (Virilio 4) in a technologically “transformative moment” (Boxall 4). A “reality hunger” for the contemporary brings together a “burgeoning group of interrelated […] artists in a multitude of forms of media” (Shields 3) to experiment new forms across disciplines through ekphrasis, which “strikes to explode” the “stuffed package” of a culture “containable with its shaped word” (Krieger 233). In her essay “Art Objects” (1995), Jeanette Winterson shows her interest in contemporary conceptual art as she writes that “the true artist is interested in the art object as an art process” and establishing a connection to the future instead of being interested in the final product (12). Her definition of art coincides with that of conceptual art as it seeks to analyse “the ideas underlying the creation and reception of art” (Shanken 433), and thus takes on the framework of the meta-critical process from conceptual art with “the use of scientific concepts and technological media both to question their prescribed applications and to create new aesthetic models” (Shanken 434). Deriving from the artistic landscape of conceptual installation art and its interactions with science, Winterson borrows the subject of the nature morte and the metafictional framework to address the clashes between artificial life forms and the human civilisation by alluding to artworks such as those of Damien Hirst in her novel Frankissstein (2019) when writing about cryonic bodies: “It’s a little like an art installation in here isn’t it? Have you seen Damien Hirst’s pickled shark in a tank?” (106). Based on the interdisciplinary interrelations between installation art and contemporary literature, this paper will read the dialogue between Winterson’s ekphrastic subject of the nature morte in Frankissstein and contemporary installation art, including works of Hirst, Cai Guo-Qiang, and Guillaume Paris, as a response to the rise of artificial life forms with respect to their metafictional and illusional nature as AI will become “fully self-designing” (Winterson 73).

Morphological Sensitivity and Falling Behavior of Paper V-Shapes

Behavioral diversity seen in biological systems is, at the most basic level, driven by interactions between physical materials and their environment. In this context we are interested in falling paper systems, specifically the V-shaped falling paper (VSFP) system that exhibits a set of discrete falling behaviors across the morphological parameter space. Our previous work has investigated how morphology influences dominant falling behaviors in the VSFP system. In this article we build on this analysis to investigate the nature of behavioral transitions in the same system. First, we investigate stochastic behavior transitions. We demonstrate how morphology influences the likelihood of different transitions, with certain morphologies leading to a wide range of possible paths through the behavior-space. Second, we investigate deterministic transitions. To investigate behaviors over longer time periods than available in falling experiments we introduce a new experimental platform. We demonstrate how we can induce behavior transitions by modulating the energy input to the system. Certain behavior transitions are found to be irreversible, exhibiting a form of hysteresis, while others are fully reversible. Certain morphologies are shown to behave like simplistic sequential logic circuits, indicating that the system has a form of memory encoded into the morphology–environment interactions. Investigating the limits of how morphology–environment interactions induce non-trivial behaviors is a key step for the design of embodied artificial life-forms.

Self-replication of a quantum artificial organism driven by single-photon pulses

Imitating the transition from inanimate to living matter is a longstanding challenge. Artificial life has achieved computer programs that self-replicate, mutate, compete and evolve, but lacks self-organized hardwares akin to the self-assembly of the first living cells. Nonequilibrium thermodynamics has achieved lifelike self-organization in diverse physical systems, but has not yet met the open-ended evolution of living organisms. Here, I look for the emergence of an artificial-life code in a nonequilibrium physical system undergoing self-organization. I devise a toy model where the onset of self-replication of a quantum artificial organism (a chain of lambda systems) is owing to single-photon pulses added to a zero-temperature environment. I find that spontaneous mutations during self-replication are unavoidable in this model, due to rare but finite absorption of off-resonant photons. I also show that the replication probability is proportional to the absorbed work from the photon, thereby fulfilling a dissipative adaptation (a thermodynamic mechanism underlying lifelike self-organization). These results hint at self-replication as the scenario where dissipative adaptation (pointing towards convergence) coexists with open-ended evolution (pointing towards divergence).

Developmental changes in perceived moral standing of robots

We live in an age where robots are increasingly present in the social and moral world. Here, we explore how children and adults think about the mental lives and moral standing of robots. In Experiment 1 (N = 116), we found that children granted humans and robots with more mental life and vulnerability to harm than an anthropomorphized control (i.e., a toy bear). In Experiment 2 (N = 157), we found that, relative to children, adults ascribed less mental life and vulnerability to harm to robots. In Experiment 3 (N = 152), we modified our experiment to be within-subjects and measured beliefs concerning moral standing. Though younger children again appeared willing to assign mental capacities — particularly those related to experience (e.g., being capable of experiencing hunger) — to robots, older children and adults did so to a lesser degree. This diminished attribution of mental life tracked with diminished ratings of robot moral standing. This informs ongoing debates concerning emerging attitudes about artificial life.