Chinese room argument

Author(s):  
Robert Van Gulick

John Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ argument aims to refute ‘strong AI’ (artificial intelligence), the view that instantiating a computer program is sufficient for having contentful mental states. Imagine a program that produces conversationally appropriate Chinese responses to Chinese utterances. Suppose Searle, who understands no Chinese, sits in a room and is passed slips of paper bearing strings of shapes which, unbeknown to him, are Chinese sentences. Searle performs the formal manipulations of the program and passes back slips bearing conversationally appropriate Chinese responses. Searle seems to instantiate the program, but understands no Chinese. So, Searle concludes, strong AI is false.

2019 ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Alan J. McComas

This chapter considers the question of whether or not nonliving systems can acquire consciousness. It explores contemporary advances in technology, particularly in the field of artificial intelligence. The chapter also considers whether or not consciousness can be performed if inorganic matter replaced the components with which organisms experience consciousness. These and similar questions on nonhuman intelligence and consciousness are fleshed out with scenarios and thought experiments proposed throughout the 20th century, such as John Searle’s Chinese room argument and the archangel paradigm proposed by C. D. Broad. The chapter concludes with reflections on the human being’s inability to truly experience consciousness in the same way as nonhumans.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic

The Chinese room argument is famous argument introduced by John Searle, in which Searle presented various problems with the claim that it is possible for the artificial intelligence to have understanding of a language in a way in which intelligent beings such as humans have that capacity. The argument was influential enough to, in decades following it, sparke numerous responses and critiques, along with a few alleged improvements to it from Searle. In this article, I will analyze one atypical critique of Searle?s argument, made by Mark Sprevak. Sprevak, unlike the other critics of the argument, agrees with Searle that understanding does not exist in Chinese room in any way, but he claims that Chinese room cannot execute every possible program, like Searle claims. Because of that, Searle cannot conclude the strong conclusion he wants from The Chinese room argument. In this article, I will analyze Searle?s argument, I will give a brief overview of typical responses to it, and I will analyze Sprevak?s response. In the last section, I will present argument that shows that Sprevak, if he wants to keep his conclusions, must either give up one part of his response, or accept one of the typical responses to Searle?s argument, thus making his own response dependent on the response from others.


2002 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-378
Author(s):  
David Anderson ◽  
B. Jack Copeland

“Strong artificial life” refers to the thesis that a sufficiently sophisticated computer simulation of a life form is a life form in its own right. Can John Searle's Chinese room argument [12]—originally intended by him to show that the thesis he dubs “strong AI” is false—be deployed against strong ALife? We have often encountered the suggestion that it can be (even in print; see Harnad [8]). We do our best to transfer the argument from the domain of AI to that of ALife. We do so in order to show once and for all that the Chinese room argument proves nothing about ALife. There may indeed be powerful philosophical objections to the thesis of strong ALife, but the Chinese room argument is not among them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-49
Author(s):  
Corey Baron

This paper argues against John Searle in defense of the potential for computers to understand language (“Strong AI”) by showing that semantic meaning is itself a second-order system of rules that connects symbols and syntax with extralinguistic facts. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument is contested on theoretical and practical grounds by identifying two problems in the thought experiment, and evidence about “machine learning” is used to demonstrate that computers are already capable of learning to form true observation sentences in the same way humans do. Finally, sarcasm is used as an example to extend the argument to more complex uses of language


1991 ◽  
Vol 45 (10) ◽  
pp. 1739-1745
Author(s):  
Min J. Yang ◽  
Paul W. Yang

A computerized infrared interpreter has been developed on an IBM personal computer (PC) running under the Microsoft disk operating system (DOS). Based on the original Merck Sharp & Dhome Research Laboratory Program for the Analysis of InfRared Spectra (PAIRS), this infrared interpreter, PC PAIRS+, is capable of analyzing infrared spectra measured from a wide variety of spectrophotometers. Modifications to PAIRS now allow the application of both artificial intelligence and library searching techniques in the program. A new algorithm has been devised to combine the results from the library searching and the PAIRS program to enhance the dependability of interpretational data. The increased capability of this infrared interpreter along with its applicability on a personal computer results in a powerful, general-purpose, and easy-to-use infrared interpretation system. Applications of PC PAIRS+ on petrochemical samples are described.


Scholarpedia ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (8) ◽  
pp. 3100 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Searle

Author(s):  
Daryna Prylypko

Key words: copyright, work, artificial intelligence, computer program In the article, the problemsof legislation of Ukraine regarding the issues of copyright on works created due to artificialintelligence were analyzed. Particularly, who is the owner of copyright ofworks created due to artificial intelligence. On the one hand, it could be a developer ofa computer program, from the other hand, it could be a client or an employer. Because,it could happen that there is a situation when robots created something newand original, e.g., how it happened with the project “New Rembrandt”. In this case,computers created a unique portrait of Rembrandt. And here is a question, where isin this portrait original and intellectual works of developers of these computers andprograms. In the contrast, this portrait could be created without people who developedspecial machines, programs, and computers. The article’s author proposes to addinto Ukrainian legislation with following norm: the owner of the copyright createddue to artificial intelligence should be a natural person who uses artificial intelligencefor these purposes within the official relationship or on the basis of a contract. In caseof automatic generation of such work by artificial intelligence, the owner of copyrightshould be the developer.Also, another question arises, particularly, who will be responsible for the damagecaused by the artificial intelligence. As an example, of the solution for this issue Resolution2015/2103 (INL) was given, where is mentioned that human agent could be responsiblefor the caused damage. Because, it is not always a developer is responsiblefor the damage.Also, the legislation and justice practice of foreign countries was explored. Theways of overcoming mentioned problems in legislation of Ukraine were proposed.Such as changing our legislation and giving the exact explanation in who is the ownerof copyright on works created due to artificial intelligence and in which cases this personcould become an owner of the copyright. However, probably, these issues shouldbe resolved at international level regarding globalization.


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