Market structure and competitive equilibrium in dynamic economic models

1987 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall D Wright
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Economic Models

Non-robustness of some economic models

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kislaya Prasad
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper considers the robustness of optimal decisions in a model of monopoly and a model of competitive equilibrium in a securities market. Robustness, defined as payoffs being continuous with respect to perturbations in the underlying model, fails to hold for either model. Decision rules are made robust by appropriately "smoothing" the problem, and by decreasing the weight given to small details of belief that can cause large changes in optimal payoffs.

Economic Models of Parenting

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Niolon
Keyword(s):  
Economic Models

On the Methodology of Cartel agreements analysis

2014 ◽  
pp. 53-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Andreyashchenko ◽  
A. Zazdravnykh
Keyword(s):  
Economic Models ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Industrial Markets

This article is an attempt of summarizing key economic approaches to cartel agreements analysis, its stability, ways of estimating social consequences of cartel agreements. It is alleged that the traditional way of understanding the cartels’ role as completely negative is not accurate; this type of inter-corporate agreements may also bring positive effects on industrial markets. Typical limits of analytical apparatus, contradictions that appear while interpreting results of specific economic models are also represented in the article, as well as substantiation of a discrete role of pricing factor within the analysis of anti-competitive agreements.

Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Monitoring ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Environment Monitoring ◽  
Nature Protection ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

Kornai, Schumpeter, and Economic Theory

2012 ◽  
pp. 145-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Maevsky
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Macro Level ◽  
Mainstream Economic ◽  
Level Of Analysis

The author claims that J. Kornai in his paper Innovation and Dynamism (Voprosy Ekonomiki. 2012. No 4) ignored the understanding of socialism as a specific type of culture and not just as an economic system. He also shows profound differences between Schumpeters theory and mainstream economic models. Evolutionary theory, he claims, may itself become mainstream if Schumpeters legacy is not interpreted straightforwardly and if evolutionary economists consider not only micro-, but also macro-level of analysis in studying macrogenerations of capital of a different age.

Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Market Behavior ◽  
Database Analysis ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

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