On the options for incorporating nuclear data uncertainties in criticality safety assessments for LWR fuel

2018 ◽  
Vol 116 ◽  
pp. 57-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Vasiliev ◽  
D. Rochman ◽  
M. Pecchia ◽  
H. Ferroukhi
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (14) ◽  
pp. 6499
Author(s):  
Matthias Frankl ◽  
Mathieu Hursin ◽  
Dimitri Rochman ◽  
Alexander Vasiliev ◽  
Hakim Ferroukhi

Presently, a criticality safety evaluation methodology for the final geological disposal of Swiss spent nuclear fuel is under development at the Paul Scherrer Institute in collaboration with the Swiss National Technical Competence Centre in the field of deep geological disposal of radioactive waste. This method in essence pursues a best estimate plus uncertainty approach and includes burnup credit. Burnup credit is applied by means of a computational scheme called BUCSS-R (Burnup Credit System for the Swiss Reactors–Repository case) which is complemented by the quantification of uncertainties from various sources. BUCSS-R consists in depletion, decay and criticality calculations with CASMO5, SERPENT2 and MCNP6, respectively, determining the keff eigenvalues of the disposal canister loaded with the Swiss spent nuclear fuel assemblies. However, the depletion calculation in the first and the criticality calculation in the third step, in particular, are subject to uncertainties in the nuclear data input. In previous studies, the effects of these nuclear data-related uncertainties on obtained keff values, stemming from each of the two steps, have been quantified independently. Both contributions to the overall uncertainty in the calculated keff values have, therefore, been considered as fully correlated leading to an overly conservative estimation of total uncertainties. This study presents a consistent approach eliminating the need to assume and take into account unrealistically strong correlations in the keff results. The nuclear data uncertainty quantification for both depletion and criticality calculation is now performed at once using one and the same set of perturbation factors for uncertainty propagation through the corresponding calculation steps of the evaluation method. The present results reveal the overestimation of nuclear data-related uncertainties by the previous approach, in particular for spent nuclear fuel with a high burn-up, and underline the importance of consistent nuclear data uncertainty quantification methods. However, only canister loadings with UO2 fuel assemblies are considered, not offering insights into potentially different trends in nuclear data-related uncertainties for mixed oxide fuel assemblies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 11020
Author(s):  
Klaus Guber ◽  
Carlos Paradela ◽  
Jan Heyse ◽  
Stefan Kopecky ◽  
Peter Schillebeeckx ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 341-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.L. Williams ◽  
G. Ilas ◽  
W.J. Marshall ◽  
B.T. Rearden

Author(s):  
Lon Paulson ◽  
John Zino ◽  
Qi Ao

The GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) nuclear criticality safety (NCS) function remains actively engaged in advancements to the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition to its traditional BWR fuel manufacturing, recent GEH emphasis to become more vertically integrated into front end (enrichment) and back end (reprocessing) fuel cycle technologies has had a dramatic impact on the NCS function. Required fundamental and practical research in various fields, such as general physics, computational methods, validation methodology, cross-section data processing, criticality safety assessments, risk-informed integrated safety analyses, and domestic and international nuclear packaging licensing, collectively present significant challenges to NCS staff. As the landscape of the GEH business growth opportunities continues to evolve over time, so does the required depth of NCS knowledge and technical expertise. This paper provides an overview of select NCS design, licensing, methods, and packaging activities in support of GEH nuclear fuel cycle business subsidiaries and concludes with some insight to technical and regulatory challenges.


2016 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 150-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Rochman ◽  
A. Vasiliev ◽  
H. Ferroukhi ◽  
T. Zhu ◽  
S.C. van der Marck ◽  
...  

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Rochman ◽  
A. J. Koning ◽  
S. C. van der Marck ◽  
Audrey Chatillon ◽  
Herbert Faust ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
P. Wood ◽  
M. Askarieh ◽  
P. Lock

The role of Nirex is to provide the UK with safe, environmentally sound and publicly acceptable options for the long-term management of radioactive materials. This will include all intermediate-level waste and some low-level waste (ILW and LLW). Nirex has developed a Phased Disposal Concept based on conditioning the wastes then isolating them deep underground. Based on this phased disposal concept, Nirex advises waste producers on the conditioning and packaging of radioactive waste. The ILW and LLW which comprise the ‘reference volume’ of the Phased Disposal Concept contain approximately 5 t Pu-239 and 28 t U-235. Nirex’s work is based on a number of standards for safety and environmental protection set by the Government. Three different Regulators ensure application of these standards in the transport, operation and post-closure phases. Therefore a coherent approach to criticality safety is required. The approach to criticality safety begins by avoiding criticality resulting from the way in which the waste is packaged, by controlling the package design including the level of fissile material. The concept safety assessments will support a screening level of approximately 5 g Pu-239 equivalent. In specific cases where waste producers indicate that their proposed packages will not comply with the screening level, package-specific criticality safety assessments can be incorporated into the concept through the change control process. Engineering measures are available to prevent criticality for such time as the waste packaging affords a high level of containment. In the long term, however, after deterioration of the physical containment provided by the waste packages, there would be the possibility of movement of fissile material out of the waste packages and subsequent accumulation into new configurations which could in principle lead to a criticality. It is conceivable that a criticality could adversely impact on the performance of a repository after closure because, for example, of the heat that would be produced affecting the engineered barriers. It is therefore necessary to consider the post-closure criticality safety of the repository concept. Nirex is currently undertaking a programme of work on ‘understanding criticality under repository conditions’. The aim of the programme is to obtain a better understanding of the processes that would control the nature and magnitude of a criticality under the particular conditions of the concept repository. An essential component of demonstrating criticality safety is to ensure waste packagers develop operating arrangements, and provide objective evidence in the form of criticality compliance assurance documentation, to demonstrate how fissile material will be controlled to meet levels defined in concept criticality safety assessments. This paper will describe the coherent approach and the processes by which it is applied.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 (3) ◽  
pp. 160-170
Author(s):  
Olga Nikolaevna Andrianova ◽  
Yury Evgen’evich Golovko ◽  
Gennady Nikolaevich Manturov

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