Co-reconfiguration of product family and supply chain using leader–follower Stackelberg game theory: Bi-level multi-objective optimization

2020 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 106203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milad Pakseresht ◽  
Iraj Mahdavi ◽  
Babak Shirazi ◽  
Nezam Mahdavi-Amiri
2011 ◽  
Vol 58-60 ◽  
pp. 28-35
Author(s):  
Ge Fu Zhang ◽  
Dong Hui Wang

The purpose of this paper is to construct a multi-objective optimization model for cooperative pricing in the management of apparel supply chain. Firstly, by using Apparel Popularity Index (API) model, a kind of pricing model for supply chain has been built. Then, by introducing cooperation and other constraint conditions, a kind of cooperative pricing model was constructed. This model is a kind of Stackelberg game. The manufacturer and the retailer obtained their excess profits through the game. Lastly, this paper gave a numerical example which demonstrated that the excess profit of the cooperative supply chain was constant, and when the constraint conditions changed, the excess profit space would change at the meantime. This research result can help partners on apparel supply chain to practice Quick Response strategy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (21) ◽  
pp. 5911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Jian ◽  
Yu Guo ◽  
Lin Jiang ◽  
Yanyan An ◽  
Jiafu Su

Whether the upstream and downstream members in a supply chain (considering environmental objectives) simultaneously stabilize economic benefits has become an important problem in the process of green development. However, few quantitative studies on green supply chains have considered environmental and economic benefits to realize multi-objective optimization. To study operation and cooperation strategies with a consideration of the different objective on the level of supply chain, we first establish a green supply chain game model with profit and environment objectives simultaneously considered by the manufacturer. Then, we analyze the multi-objective decisions of the supply chain members under centralized control using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and revenue-sharing contract. Using the manufacturer’s environmental preference as a variable, the effects of environmental benefits on the supply chain are also investigated. Finally, this study determines that the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced after considering the objective of environmental benefits, while the retailer’s profit, product greenness, and environmental benefits will be improved. Meanwhile, the total profit of the green supply chain will first increase and then decrease. In particular, a revenue-sharing contract can facilitate the coordination of multiple objectives; in this way, both the manufacturer and the retailer achieve higher profits and environmental benefits compared to a decentralized control condition, which is of great significance in achieving a win–win situation for the economy and the environment.


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