A retailer-supplier supply chain model with trade credit default risk in a supplier-Stackelberg game

2017 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 568-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengfeng Wu ◽  
Qiuhong Zhao ◽  
Menghao Xi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Credit Default

A loss-averse retailer–supplier supply chain model under trade credit in a supplier-Stackelberg game

2021 ◽  
Vol 182 ◽  
pp. 353-365
Author(s):  
Chengfeng Wu ◽  
Xin Liu ◽  
Annan Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Supply Chain Model

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of a Three-Stage Supply Chain: A New Research in the Big Data Era

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
New Research ◽  
New Situation ◽  
Big Data Technology

In the Big Data era, Data Company as the Big Data information (BDI) supplier should be included in a supply chain. In the new situation, to research the pricing strategies of supply chain, a three-stage supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, considering the manufacturer contained the internal and external BDI, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in both decentralized and centralized supply chain using Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the optimal retail price and benefits in the four models were compared. Findings are as follows. (1) The industry cost improvement coefficient, the internal BDI investment cost of the manufacturer, and the added cost of the Data Company on using Big Data technology have different relationships with the optimal prices of supply chain members in different models. (2) In the retailer-dominated supply chain model, the optimal benefits of the retailer and the manufacturer are the same, and the optimal benefits of the Data Company are biggest in all the members.

scholarly journals Order Size Dependent Trade Credit Study in a Three Echelon Supply Chain Model

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 193-199
Author(s):  
Narayan Singh ◽  
Bindu Vaish ◽  
S R Singh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Size Dependent ◽  
Supply Chain Model

scholarly journals Effects of Variable Production Rate and Time-Dependent Holding Cost for Complementary Products in Supply Chain Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Variable Production

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.

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