scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Zhang Zhijian ◽  
Peng Wang ◽  
Miyu Wan ◽  
Junhua Guo ◽  
Jian Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Joint Effect ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern

The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies of a Three-Stage Supply Chain: A New Research in the Big Data Era

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Pan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Investment Cost ◽  
New Research ◽  
New Situation ◽  
Big Data Technology

In the Big Data era, Data Company as the Big Data information (BDI) supplier should be included in a supply chain. In the new situation, to research the pricing strategies of supply chain, a three-stage supply chain with one manufacturer, one retailer, and one Data Company was chosen. Meanwhile, considering the manufacturer contained the internal and external BDI, four benefit models about BDI investment were proposed and analyzed in both decentralized and centralized supply chain using Stackelberg game. Meanwhile, the optimal retail price and benefits in the four models were compared. Findings are as follows. (1) The industry cost improvement coefficient, the internal BDI investment cost of the manufacturer, and the added cost of the Data Company on using Big Data technology have different relationships with the optimal prices of supply chain members in different models. (2) In the retailer-dominated supply chain model, the optimal benefits of the retailer and the manufacturer are the same, and the optimal benefits of the Data Company are biggest in all the members.

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Pricing Models in a Dyadic Supply Chain With Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhishek Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Channel Coordination ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Fairness Concern

The existing studies on fairness in channel coordination assume markets as the group of oligopolies in which a few firms dominate, scant evidence has been provided where fairness concerns are investigated for a market scenario where all firms share equal dominance. This article considers a dyadic supply chain composed of one fair-minded manufacturer and one fair-minded retailer and investigate their pricing decisions under two different non-cooperative game-theoretic frameworks: manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and Vertical Nash game and provide a comparative analysis. The results show that the prices of the Stackelberg game model are always higher than that of the corresponding prices of the Vertical Nash game. We also find that the prices gap between the two models decreases with the retailer's fairness concern, and is uncertain with respect to manufacturer's fairness. In addition, the manufacturer's (retailer's) profit in the Stackelberg game is decreasing (increasing) in its own fairness and is uncertain in the Vertical Nash game. Furthermore, findings are illustrated through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Research on the supply chain model based on the differentiation of green agricultural products

2018 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 02012
Author(s):  
Hui Su ◽  
Yuquan Cui ◽  
Bingjie Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Chain Model

This paper studies the supply chain of green agricultural products with "agricultural super docking" mode based on the different management. The "agricultural super docking" mode is a direct connection between supermarkets and farmers (or cooperatives), what the supermarket needs and what the farmers produce. The green degree is used to indicate the quality level of health, safety and nutrition of agricultural products. The greater the green degree is, the better the quality of agricultural products is. In order to meet the needs of all consumers, the supermarket decide to carry out different management. That is to say, supermarket sells ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products at the same time. This paper gives the consumer utility function for ordinary agricultural products and green agricultural products separately. We analyze the consumers’ choice behaviors based on the consumer utility function .We discuss the optimal decision of supermarket choosing one farmer and supermarket choosing two farmers based on Stackelberg game. It can be seen from the comparison that supermarket can get more profits when it chooses two farmer to order separately. Finally, a "wholesale price + ordering subsidy" coordination mechanism is proposed to realize supply chain coordination. .

scholarly journals Effects of Variable Production Rate and Time-Dependent Holding Cost for Complementary Products in Supply Chain Model

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitali Sarkar ◽  
Sun Hur ◽  
Biswajit Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Rate ◽  
Graphical Representation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Complementary Products ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Holding Cost ◽  
Variable Production

Recently, a major trend is going to redesign a production system by controlling or making variable the production rate within some fixed interval to maintain the optimal level. This strategy is more effective when the holding cost is time-dependent as it is interrelated with holding duration of products and rate of production. An effort is made to make a supply chain model (SCM) to show the joint effect of variable production rate and time-varying holding cost for specific type of complementary products, where those products are made by two different manufacturers and a common retailer makes them bundle and sells bundles to end customers. Demand of each product is specified by stochastic reservation prices with a known potential market size. Those players of the SCM are considered with unequal power. Stackelberg game approach is employed to obtain global optimum solution of the model. An illustrative numerical example, graphical representation, and managerial insights are given to illustrate the model. Results prove that variable production rate and time-dependent holding cost save more than existing literature.

scholarly journals Optimal ordering policy in a two-echelon supply chain model with variable backorder and demand uncertainty

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumon Sarkar ◽  
B. C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Solution Algorithms ◽  
Supply Chain Model ◽  
Credit Financing

The paper investigates a two-echelon production-delivery supply chain model for products with stochastic demand and backorder-lost sales mixture under trade-credit financing. The manufacturer delivers the retailer's order quantity in a number of equal-sized shipments. The replenishment lead-time is such that it can be crashed to a minimum duration at an additional cost that can be treated as an investment. Shortages in the retailer's inventory are allowed to occur and are partially backlogged with a backlogging rate dependent on customer's waiting time. Moreover, the manufacturer offers the retailer a credit period which is less than the reorder interval. The model is formulated to find the optimal solutions for order quantity, safety factor, lead time, and the number of shipments from the manufacturer to the retailer in light of both distribution-free and known distribution functions. Two solution algorithms are provided to obtain the optimal decisions for the integrated system. The effects of controllable lead time, backorder rate and trade-credit financing on optimal decisions are illustrated through numerical examples.

scholarly journals Research of Dual-channel Supply Chain Decision with Consideration of Low-carbon and Fairness Concerns

2021 ◽  
Vol 275 ◽  
pp. 02062
Author(s):  
Guoshuai Niu ◽  
Qi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Single Channel ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Double Channel

With in-depth implementation of policies on energy conservation and emission reduction and rising of low-carbon production practice in enterprises, low-carbon supply chain has gradually become a research issue which causes extensive attentions from scholars. However, most existing researches focus on supply chain decision and coordination under the background of single channel or mere consideration of fairness concerns of retailers. Therefore, the fairness concerns of manufacturers were taken into account in the double-channel low-carbon supply chain. A double-channel low-carbon supply chain model was constructed to research the influence of manufacturers’ fairness concerns to the optimal decision-making of all parties in the supply chain and to the overall performance of supply chain. The research results suggested that: with improvement of manufacturers’ fairness concern coefficient, the decision-making of supply chain members demonstrated different changing strength; the manufacturers’ fairness concern caused harm to overall profit of supply chain.

Coordination of the Closed Loop Supply Chain with Retailers' Competition

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 4566-4569
Author(s):  
Ting Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Linear Model ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Perishable Products ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Optimal Price ◽  
Special Linear ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Supply Chain Model

To reflect the coordination in the supply chain of perishable products with free competition, a single manufacturer and two retailers supply chain model facing the stochastic demand in relation with different prices and the return mechanism is established. The analysis shows that the profit of total supply chain without competition is obviously fewer than that with competition, and through the special linear model the paper employs the result, also gives the optimal price and order quantity in the coordination of the supply chain.

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