Cognitive models of risky choice: Parameter stability and predictive accuracy of prospect theory

Cognition ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 123 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Glöckner ◽  
Thorsten Pachur
1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Quattrone ◽  
Amos Tversky

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangil Lee ◽  
Chris M. Glaze ◽  
Eric T. Bradlow ◽  
Joe Kable

In intertemporal and risky choice decisions, parametric utility models are widely used for predicting choice and measuring individuals’ impulsivity and risk aversion. However, parametric utility models cannot describe data deviating from their assumed functional form. We propose a novel method using Cubic Bezier Splines (CBS) to flexibly model smooth and monotonic utility functions that can be fit to any dataset. CBS shows higher descriptive and predictive accuracy over extant parametric models and can identify common yet novel patterns of behavior previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, CBS provides measures of impulsivity and risk aversion that do not depend on parametric model assumptions.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Bianca Jarecki ◽  
Jörg Rieskamp

Decision making under risk is often studied as a preferential choice governed by stable individual personality characteristics, but risky choice can also be viewed as a dynamic problem of resource accumulation to survive. When decision makers aim to reach a particular goal in limited time, such as “earn at least $100 in five choices,” risky choice becomes a non-trivial planning problem. This problem has an optimal solution that can differ from immediate expected-value maximization. We studied the optimality of risky choices under such minimum goal requirements experimentally and find that the observed choices under goals approximate the optimal solution. However, because the optimal model is very complex, we examine if simpler models can predict people’s choices better. We test an extended version of prospect theory, assuming a dynamic reference point that depends on the distance to the goal. This “dynamic prospect theory” was better than the alternative model in describing people’s decisions (i.e., for 63% of the participants, it was the best model). Our findings show that humans can excel in a highly complex, dynamic, risky choice problem and that a dynamic version of prospect theory provides one possible explanation for how people decide under risk when long-term goals matter.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Pedroni ◽  
Jörg Rieskamp ◽  
Thorsten Pachur ◽  
Renato Frey ◽  
Jonathan E. Westfall ◽  
...  

The investigation of decisions under risk has mainly followed one of two approaches.One relies on observing choices between lotteries in which economic primitives (outcome magnitudes, probabilities, and domains (i.e., gains and losses)) are varied systematically, and this information is described to participants. The systematic variation of the economic primitives allows to formally describe behavior with expectation-based models such as expected utility theory or cumulative prospect theory (CPT), arguably the most prominent descriptive theories of risky choice. One drawback, however, is that lottery tasks can seem artificial, likely reducing the external or ecological validity. A second more naturalistic approach employs dynamic paradigms that mimic features of real-life risky situations and are assumed to have higher ecological validity. Because key information are often not provided to the decision maker, it is impossible to apply the same models as in the first approach. The goal of the present work is to integrate both approaches, by developing models for the "hot" Columbia Card Task (CCT), a task that combines a dynamic decision situation with systematic trial-to-trial variation in economic primitives. In a model comparison on the basis of the data of 191 participants, we identified a best-performing model that describes behavior as a function of CPT’s main components, outcome sensitivity, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Our work therefore provides a framework that allows the description of risk-taking behavior in a naturalistic dynamic task based on key psychological constructs (e.g., loss aversion, probability weighting) that are rooted in the factorial variation of economic primitives.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (6) ◽  
pp. 1487-1505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petko Kusev ◽  
Paul van Schaik ◽  
Peter Ayton ◽  
John Dent ◽  
Nick Chater

Psychometrika ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 716-737
Author(s):  
Sangil Lee ◽  
Chris M. Glaze ◽  
Eric T. Bradlow ◽  
Joseph W. Kable

Abstract In intertemporal and risky choice decisions, parametric utility models are widely used for predicting choice and measuring individuals’ impulsivity and risk aversion. However, parametric utility models cannot describe data deviating from their assumed functional form. We propose a novel method using cubic Bezier splines (CBS) to flexibly model smooth and monotonic utility functions that can be fit to any dataset. CBS shows higher descriptive and predictive accuracy over extant parametric models and can identify common yet novel patterns of behavior that are inconsistent with extant parametric models. Furthermore, CBS provides measures of impulsivity and risk aversion that do not depend on parametric model assumptions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 236-248
Author(s):  
Garth Ryan Homan ◽  
Gary van Vuuren

Behavioral components of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory (PT) were applied to derive an adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in the estimation of merger and acquisition-intensive firms’ expected returns. The premise was that the CAPM – rooted in expected utility theory – is violated by the behavioral biases identified in prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979) has demonstrated that weaknesses abound in the viability of classical utility theory predictions. For mergers and acquisitions, firms appear to be isolated from and immune to human error, yet decisions which involve the undertaking of capital-intensive projects are delegated to senior management. These individuals are prone to cognitive biases and personalized risk appetites that may (and often do) compromize attitudes and behavior when it comes to pricing risky ventures. Having established that beta estimates using linear regression are inferior, the CAPM was implemented utilizing beta estimates obtained from the Kalman filter. The results obtained were assessed for their long-term market price predictive accuracy. The authors test the reliability of the CAPM as a predictor of price, observe the rationality of human behavior in capital markets, and attempt to model premiums to adjust CAPM returns to a level that more appropriately accounts for firm specific risk. The researchers show that market participants behave irrationally when assessing M&A firms’ specific risk. Logistic regression coupled with the development of a risk premium was implemented to correct the original Kalman filter returns and was tested for improvements in predictive power.


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