Attention and salience in preference reversals

We investigate the implications of Salience Theory for the classical preference reversal phenomenon, where monetary valuations contradict risky choices. It has been stated that one factor behind reversals is that monetary valuations of lotteries are inflated when elicited in isolation, and that they should be reduced if an alternative lottery is present and draws attention. We conducted two preregistered experiments, an online choice study ($$N=256$$ N = 256 ) and an eye-tracking study ($$N=64$$ N = 64 ), in which we investigated salience and attention in preference reversals, manipulating salience through the presence or absence of an alternative lottery during evaluations. We find that the alternative lottery draws attention, and that fixations on that lottery influence the evaluation of the target lottery as predicted by Salience Theory. The effect, however, is of a modest magnitude and fails to translate into an effect on preference reversal rates in either experiment. We also use transitions (eye movements) across outcomes of different lotteries to study attention on the states of the world underlying Salience Theory, but we find no evidence that larger salience results in more transitions.

Revisiting the Open Sampling format: Improving risky choices through a novel graphical representation

When making risky choices, people often fall short of the norm of expected value (EV) maximization. Previous research has shown that presenting options in the Open Sampling (OSa) format, a 10-by-10 matrix of randomly arranged outcomes, can improve choices and reduce decision times. First, the current research aims to replicate and extend the findings on the OSa format. To this end, we compare OSa to the common description-based format as well as further graphical representations, and investigate the resulting accordance with EV maximization and decision time. Second, we study whether people lower (vs. higher) in numeracy, the ability to use probabilistic and mathematical concepts, particularly benefit from a graphical representation of options. We conducted five high-powered studies (total N = 1,575) in which participants chose repeatedly between two risky gambles, using different populations and gamble-problem sets. Overall, we could not find a benefit of the OSa format in terms of EV accordance in any of the five studies. However, three studies also tested a novel variant of the OSa format with grouped outcomes and found that it consistently improved EV accordance compared with all other formats. All graphical formats led to faster decisions without harming decision quality. The effects of presentation format were not moderated by numeracy in three of the four studies that assessed numeracy. In conclusion, our research introduces a new presentation format which consistently improves risky choices and can also be used to communicate risks in applied contexts such as medical decision making.

Replicating the Disease framing problem during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic: A study of stress, worry, trust, and choice under risk

In the risky-choice framing effect, different wording of the same options leads to predictably different choices. In a large-scale survey conducted from March to May 2020 and including 88,181 participants from 47 countries, we investigated how stress, concerns, and trust moderated the effect in the Disease problem, a prominent framing problem highly evocative of the COVID-19 pandemic. As predicted by the appraisal-tendency framework, risk aversion and the framing effect in our study were larger than under typical circumstances. Furthermore, perceived stress and concerns over coronavirus were positively associated with the framing effect. Contrary to predictions, however, they were not related to risk aversion. Trust in the government’s efforts to handle the coronavirus was associated with neither risk aversion nor the framing effect. The proportion of risky choices and the framing effect varied substantially across nations. Additional exploratory analyses showed that the framing effect was unrelated to reported compliance with safety measures, suggesting, along with similar findings during the pandemic and beyond, that the effectiveness of framing manipulations in public messages might be limited. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed, along with directions for further investigations.

Impaired dissociation of advantageous and disadvantageous risky choices in adolescents: the role of experience-based learning

Adolescence is characterized by a surge in maladaptive risk-taking behaviors, but whether and how this relates to developmental changes in experience-based learning is largely unknown. In this preregistered study, we addressed this issue using a novel task that allowed us to separate the learning-driven optimization of risky choice behavior over time from overall risk-taking tendencies. Adolescents (12-17 years old) learned to dissociate advantageous from disadvantageous risky choices less well than adults (20-35 years old), and this impairment was stronger in early than mid-late adolescents. Computational modeling revealed that adolescents’ suboptimal performance was largely due to an inefficiency in core learning and choice processes. Specifically, adolescents used a simpler, suboptimal, expectation-updating process and a more stochastic choice policy. In addition, the modeling results suggested that adolescents, but not adults, overvalued the highest rewards. Finally, an exploratory latent-mixture model analysis indicated that a substantial proportion of the participants in each age group did not engage in experience-based learning but used a gambler’s fallacy strategy, stressing the importance of analyzing individual differences. Our results help understand why adolescents tend to make more, and more persistent, maladaptive risky decisions than adults when the values of these decisions have to be learned from experience.

Individual-level loss aversion in riskless and risky choices

Loss aversion can occur in riskless and risky choices. We present novel evidence on both in a non-student sample (660 randomly selected customers of a car manufacturer). We measure loss aversion in riskless choice in endowment effect experiments within and between subjects and find similar levels of average loss aversion in both. The subjects of the within study also participate in a simple lottery choice task which arguably measures loss aversion in risky choices. We find substantial heterogeneity in both measures of loss aversion. Loss aversion in riskless choice and loss aversion in risky choice are strongly positively correlated, but on average riskless loss aversion is higher than risky loss aversion. We find that in both choice tasks, loss aversion increases in age, income, and wealth, and decreases in education. Our results provide novel supportive input to the debate about the reality of loss aversion.

Risky Choices

Achievement data from New Zealand secondary schools suggest that students from lower socio-economic communities have fewer opportunities to engage with complex content in subject English. This article examines this phenomenon by drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality and considers how a context of simultaneously increased autonomy and surveillance may shape curriculum and assessment choices. To explore these ideas, I use interview data from ten secondary English teachers in the wider Auckland region. I complement Foucault’s (1982) explanation of governmentality with Ball, Maguire, and Braun’s (2012) notion of policy enactment to explore spaces of both compliance and resistance.

Prioritarianism, Risk, and the Gap Between Prudence and Morality

According to a prominent objection to prioritarianism, it inappropriately implies a gap between prudence and morality, even in single-person cases. Thus, according to prioritarianism, we should sometimes sacrifice an individual’s expected welfare in order to protect her from the risk of a worse outcome. The present chapter presents a critical discussion of this objection. It first provides a more precise account of axiological prioritarianism and what it implies for the relation between prudence and morality. Then it provides an account of four prioritarian theories that (unlike axiological prioritarianism) have implications for risky choices, namely ex ante prioritarianism, ex post prioritarianism, pluralist prioritarianism, and factualist prioritarianism. It then presents the objection that prioritarianism implies a gap between prudence and morality in single-person cases in greater detail, which includes explaining the extent to which this objection applies to the four different versions of prioritarianism mentioned above. Finally, the chapter defends the view that the prioritarian gap between prudence and morality is unproblematic, even in single-person cases.