Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Quattrone ◽  
Amos Tversky
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Psychological Analysis

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.

scholarly journals Deal or No Deal? Decision Making under Risk in a Large-Payoff Game Show

2008 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Post ◽  
Martijn J van den Assem ◽  
Guido Baltussen ◽  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Decision Making Under Risk ◽  
Game Show ◽  
Dependent Choice

We examine the risky choices of contestants in the popular TV game show “Deal or No Deal” and related classroom experiments. Contrary to the traditional view of expected utility theory, the choices can be explained in large part by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Risk aversion decreases after earlier expectations have been shattered by unfavorable outcomes or surpassed by favorable outcomes. Our results point to reference-dependent choice theories such as prospect theory, and suggest that path-dependence is relevant, even when the choice problems are simple and well defined, and when large real monetary amounts are at stake. (JEL D81)

scholarly journals On the futility of estimating utility functions: Why the parameters we measure are wrong, and why they do not generalize

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Stewart ◽  
Emina Canic ◽  
Timothy L Mullett
Keyword(s):  
Parameter Estimation ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Parameter Estimates ◽  
Risky Choices ◽  
Long Time

We have known for a long time that people’s risky choices depart systematically from expected utility theory,and also from related models like prospect theory. But it is still common to use expected utility theory orprospect theory to estimate parameters like risk aversion from sets of risky choices. We have also known fora long time that when parameters are estimated, a systematic departure between the model and the datacauses biased parameter estimates. Here we show how the bias in parameter estimation interacts with the setof choices presented to participants. We find that estimates of risk aversion vary greatly between choice setseven though no real differences in risk aversion exist. We find parameters do not generalise at all betweenchoice sets, even when the sets are random draws from a master choice set.

scholarly journals Cumulative Prospect Theory Version with Fuzzy Values of Outcome Estimates

Risks ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Oleg Uzhga-Rebrov ◽  
Peter Grabusts
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Cumulative Prospect Theory ◽  
Development History ◽  
Decisions Under Risk ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Factors ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

Choosing solutions under risk and uncertainty requires the consideration of several factors. One of the main factors in choosing a solution is modeling the decision maker’s attitude to risk. The expected utility theory was the first approach that allowed to correctly model various nuances of the attitude to risk. Further research in this area has led to the emergence of even more effective approaches to solving this problem. Currently, the most developed theory of choice with respect to decisions under risk conditions is the cumulative prospect theory. This paper presents the development history of various extensions of the original expected utility theory, and the analysis of the main properties of the cumulative prospect theory. The main result of this work is a fuzzy version of the prospect theory, which allows handling fuzzy values of the decisions (prospects). The paper presents the theoretical foundations of the proposed version, an illustrative practical example, and conclusions based on the results obtained.

scholarly journals An Experimental Comparison of Risky and Riskless Choice—Limitations of Prospect Theory and Expected Utility Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui-Kuan Chung ◽  
Paul Glimcher ◽  
Agnieszka Tymula
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Experimental Comparison ◽  
Reference Dependence ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Gain Loss

Prospect theory, used descriptively for decisions under both risk and certainty, presumes concave utility over gains and convex utility over losses; a pattern widely seen in lottery tasks. Although such discontinuous gain-loss reference-dependence is also used to model riskless choices, only limited empirical evidence supports this use. In incentive-compatible experiments, we find that gain-loss reflection effects are not observed under riskless choice as predicted by prospect theory, even while in the same subjects gain-loss reflection effects are observed under risk. Our empirical results challenge the application of choice models across both risky and riskless domains. (JEL C91, D12, D81)

scholarly journals Psychological parameters have units: A bug fix for stochastic prospect theory and other decision models

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Stewart ◽  
Benjamin Scheibehenne ◽  
Thorsten Pachur
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Decision Models ◽  
Strongly Correlated ◽  
Choice Data ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Parameter Measuring ◽  
Choice Probabilities

To fit models like prospect theory or expected utility theory to choice data, a stochastic model is needed to turn differences in values into choice probabilities. In these models, the parameter measuring risk aversion is strongly correlated with the parameter measuring the sensitivity to differences in value. We use dimensional analysis from the physical sciences to show that this is because the sensitivity parameter has units which depend on the risk aversion parameter. This means that comparing sensitivities across individuals with different level of risk aversion is meaningless and forbidden. We suggest a simple bug fix for prospect theory and other decision models which corrects this problem. The bug fix completely removes the correlation between sensitivity and risk aversion parameters in model estimations and allows the parameters to be interpreted as they were originally intended.

scholarly journals Probability weighting explains Independence Axiom violations of Expected Utility Theory in monkeys

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Ferrari-Toniolo ◽  
Leo Chi U Seak ◽  
Wolfram Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Independence Axiom ◽  
Probability Weighting ◽  
Preference Reversals ◽  
Risky Decision ◽  
Linear Discriminant ◽  
Better Than

Expected Utility Theory (EUT) provides axioms for maximizing utility in risky choice. The independence axiom (IA) is its most demanding axiom: preferences between two options should not change when altering both options equally by mixing them with a common gamble. We tested common consequence (CC) and common ratio (CR) violations of the IA in thousands of stochastic choice over several months using a large variety of binary option sets. Three monkeys showed few outright Preference Reversals (8%) but substantial graded Preference Changes (46%) between the initial preferred gamble and the corresponding altered gamble. Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) indicated that gamble probabilities predicted most Preference Changes in CC (72%) and CR (87%) tests. The Akaike Information Criterion indicated that probability weighting within Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) explained choices better than models using Expected Value (EV) or EUT. Fitting by utility and probability weighting functions of CPT resulted in nonlinear and non-parallel indifference curves (IC) in the Marschak-Machina triangle and suggested IA non-compliance of models using EV or EUT. Indeed, CPT models predicted Preference Changes better than EV and EUT models. Indifference points in out-of-sample tests were closer to CPT-estimated ICs than EV and EUT ICs. Finally, while the few outright Preference Reversals may reflect the long experience of our monkeys, their more graded Preference Changes corresponded to those reported for humans. In benefitting from the wide testing possibilities in monkeys, our stringent axiomatic tests contribute critical information about risky decision-making and serves as basis for investigating neuronal decision mechanisms.

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