scholarly journals Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents' epistemic states

Cognition ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 212 ◽  
pp. 104721
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
David Lagnado
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic States ◽  
Causal Judgments

scholarly journals Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents’ epistemic states

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
David Lagnado
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Bayesian Network Model ◽  
Abnormal Behaviour ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Causal Judgments ◽  
Causal Action ◽  
Acting Agent ◽  
Epistemic Asymmetry ◽  
Causal Cognition

A prominent finding in causal cognition research is people's tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. If two agents jointly cause an outcome ("conjunctive causation’"), but differ in how frequently they have performed the causal action before, people judge the atypically acting agent to have caused the outcome to a greater extent than the normally acting agent. In this paper, we argue that it is the epistemic state of an abnormally acting agent, rather than the abnormality of their action, that is driving people's causal judgments. Given the predictability of the normally acting agent's behaviour, the abnormal agent is in a better position to foresee the consequences of their action. We put this hypothesis to test in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we show that people judge the atypical agent as more causal than the normally acting agent, but also perceive an epistemic advantage of the abnormal agent. In Experiment 2, we find that people do not judge a causal difference if there is no epistemic asymmetry between the agents. In Experiment 3, we replicate these findings for a scenario in which the abnormal agent's epistemic advantage generalises to a novel context. In Experiment 4, we extend these findings to mental states more broadly construed. We develop a Bayesian Network model that predicts the degree of mental states based on action normality and epistemic states, and find that people infer mental states like desire and intentions to a greater extent from abnormal behaviour. We discuss these results in light of current theories and research on people’s preference for atypical causes.

Stimulus structure and causal judgments

1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert F. Smith ◽  
Nadine M. Meyers ◽  
Portia T. Rivera
Keyword(s):  
Causal Judgments

Causal Idealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Causal Relation ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Causal Judgments

This chapter argues that causal idealism, the view that causation is a product of mental activity, is at least as attractive as several contemporary views of causation that incorporate human thought and agency into the causal relation. The chapter discusses three such views: contextualism, which holds that truth conditions for causal judgments are contextual; contrastivism, which holds that the causal relation is a quaternary relation between a cause, an effect, and contextually specified contrast classes for the cause and the effect; and pragmatism, which holds that causal claims are sensitive to pragmatic factors. This chapter suggests that causal idealism has at least as much explanatory strength as these three theories, and is more parsimonious and internally stable.

scholarly journals Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Henne ◽  
Kevin O’Neill ◽  
Paul Bello ◽  
Sangeet Khemlani ◽  
Felipe De Brigard
Keyword(s):  
Causal Judgments

Causal Judgments and Causal Explanations

1965 ◽  
Vol 62 (23) ◽  
pp. 695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Gorovitz
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Causal Judgments

scholarly journals BASIC KNOWLEDGE FIRST

Episteme ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Keyword(s):  
First Century ◽  
Basic Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Specific Category ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Philosophical Project

ABSTRACTAn influential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for a more specific category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.

Intuitive Theories

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Gerstenberg ◽  
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Planning Model ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Rational Planning ◽  
Causal Judgments ◽  
Intuitive Theory

This chapter first explains what intuitive theories are, how they can be modeled as probabilistic, generative programs, and how intuitive theories support various cognitive functions such as prediction, counterfactual reasoning, and explanation. It focuses on two domains of knowledge: people’s intuitive understanding of physics, and their intuitive understanding of psychology. It shows how causal judgments can be modeled as counterfactual contrasts operating over an intuitive theory of physics, and how explanations of an agent’s behavior are grounded in a rational planning model that is inverted to infer the agent’s beliefs, desires, and abilities. It concludes by highlighting some of the challenges that the intuitive theories framework faces, such as understanding how intuitive theories are learned and developed.

scholarly journals Comparative standard in institutional epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-430
Author(s):  
Marko-Luka Zubcic
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Agent Development

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse?s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund?s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

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