scholarly journals Comparative standard in institutional epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-430
Author(s):  
Marko-Luka Zubcic
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Agent Development

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse?s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund?s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

Knowledge Networks in Higher Education

2019 ◽  
pp. 654-662
Author(s):  
Filipa M. Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Knowledge Creation ◽  
Knowledge Networks ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Scientific Outputs ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

Networks function as an appropriate device to explore the processes of creation and adoption of knowledge by academics in higher education institutions (HEIs), and how it can be operationalized with the concept of epistemic authority and the analysis of knowledge networks. The claim that underlies this chapter is that emergent processes of knowledge creation—in terms of epistemic states—are highly shaped by the social and knowledge networks in which academics are engaged. The primary focus of this approach to knowledge networks will be on knowledge creation. Thus, instead of focusing on the vehicles of distribution of knowledge and scientific outputs, the emphasis will be on the role of knowledge networks – seen as epistemic conduits.

scholarly journals Social values influence the adequacy conditions of scientific theories: beyond inductive risk

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Brigandt
Keyword(s):  
Human Evolution ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Epistemic Values ◽  
Inductive Risk ◽  
The Social ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Theory Acceptance ◽  
The Impact

The ‘death of evidence’ issue in Canada raises the spectre of politicized science, and thus the question of what role social values may have in science and how this meshes with objectivity and evidence. I first criticize philosophical accounts that have to separate different steps of research to restrict the influence of social and other non-epistemic values. A prominent account that social values may play a role even in the context of theory acceptance is the argument from inductive risk. It maintains that the more severe the social consequences of erroneously accepting a theory would be, the more evidence is needed before the theory may be accepted. However, an implication of this position is that increasing evidence makes the impact of social values converge to zero; and I argue for a stronger role for social values. On this position, social values (together with epistemic values and other empirical considerations) may determine a theory's conditions of adequacy, which among other things can include considerations about what makes a scientific account unbiased and complete. I illustrate this based on recent theories of human evolution and the social behaviour of non-human primates, where some of the social values implicated are feminist values. While many philosophical accounts (both arguments from inductive risk and from underdetermination) conceptualize the relevance of social values in terms of making inferences from evidence, I argue for the need for a broader philosophical framework, which is also motivated by issues pertaining to scientific explanation.

Summary on River Basin Water Resources Allocation Practice and Institutional Arrangements of China

2012 ◽  
Vol 212-213 ◽  
pp. 489-492
Author(s):  
Yuan Yuan Gao ◽  
Xin Yi Xu ◽  
Xiao Lin Yin
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Water Allocation ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Water Resources Allocation ◽  
Resources Management ◽  
The Social ◽  
Basin Water

Formulating and implementing river basin water resources allocation scheme is one of the most crucial measures to promote orderly development, efficient utilization and management, reasonable allocation of water resources. Clarifying water share for each region in a river basin and perfecting water resources allocation system can effectively contribute to achieve the social stability, eliminate the water use contradiction among different regions, realize sustainable water resources utilization and eco-social development, guarantee environment flow. It also conforms to the strictest water resources management system proposed and carried out at present of China. In order to make the readers better understand water allocation done or being done in China, river basin water resources allocation practice was summarized in this study. Institutional arrangements related to water resources allocation in China was also been summed up.

Schooling in the Course of Human Lives: The Social Context of Education and the Transition to Adulthood in Industrial Society

1993 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron M. Pallas
Keyword(s):  
Life Course ◽  
Transition To Adulthood ◽  
The United States ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Industrial Society ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Life Course ◽  
Cross National

This review examines the role of schooling in the life course of individuals, focusing on the timing and sequencing of schooling in the transition to adulthood. First, I examine conceptual issues in the study of schooling and the life course, drawing heavily on the sociological literature. I then consider the timing and sequencing of schooling in the transition to adulthood in the United States, and the consequences of variations in the timing and sequencing of schooling for adult social and economic success. I then discuss the role of social structure, norms, and institutional arrangements in the transition to adulthood, with special attention to cross-national comparisons with the U. S. and historical changes within countries. I conclude with speculations regarding trends in the role of schooling in the life course, and some directions for future research on this topic.

The Social Conditions for Nanomedicine: Disruption, Systems, and Lock-In

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-740 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Best ◽  
George Khushf
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
New World ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Social ◽  
Policy Statements ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Brave New World ◽  
Molecular Manufacturing ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Self Replication

Many believe that nanotechnology will be disruptive to our society. Presumably, this means that some people and even whole industries will be undermined by technological developments that nanoscience makes possible. This, in turn, implies that we should anticipate potential workforce disruptions, mitigate in advance social problems likely to arise, and work to fairly distribute the future benefits of nanotechnology. This general, somewhat vague sense of disruption, is very difficult to specify – what will it entail? And how can we responsibly anticipate and mitigate any problems? We can't even clearly state what the problems are anticipated to be. In fact, when we move from sweeping policy statements to more concrete accounts, nanotechnology seems to bifurcate into two divergent streams: one is fairly continuous with current developments, extending extant science in a quantitative way; the other is radically new, and includes science fiction-like dreams of molecular manufacturing and assemblers, with their utopian (or dystopian) scenarios of absolute plenty (or runaway self-replication). In these cases, “disruption” takes on the valence of Huxley's brave new world.

scholarly journals David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (124) ◽  
pp. 118-125
Author(s):  
Iñigo González Ricoy
Keyword(s):  
Princeton University ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Philosophical Framework

David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework, Princeton University Press, Nueva Jersey, 2008, xi + 309 pp.

scholarly journals Managing Different Sources of Uncertainty in a BDI Framework in a Principled Way with Tractable Fragments

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 731-775
Author(s):  
Kim Bauters ◽  
Kevin McAreavey ◽  
Weiru Liu ◽  
Jun Hong ◽  
Lluís Godo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Intelligent Systems ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Operational Semantics ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Bdi Agents ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Interacting Agents ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Syntactic Approach ◽  
Different Sources

The Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) architecture is a practical approach for modelling large-scale intelligent systems. In the BDI setting, a complex system is represented as a network of interacting agents - or components - each one modelled based on its beliefs, desires and intentions. However, current BDI implementations are not well-suited for modelling more realistic intelligent systems which operate in environments pervaded by different types of uncertainty. Furthermore, existing approaches for dealing with uncertainty typically do not offer syntactical or tractable ways of reasoning about uncertainty. This complicates their integration with BDI implementations, which heavily rely on fast and reactive decisions. In this paper, we advance the state-of-the-art w.r.t. handling different types of uncertainty in BDI agents. The contributions of this paper are, first, a new way of modelling the beliefs of an agent as a set of epistemic states. Each epistemic state can use a distinct underlying uncertainty theory and revision strategy, and commensurability between epistemic states is achieved through a stratification approach. Second, we present a novel syntactic approach to revising beliefs given unreliable input. We prove that this syntactic approach agrees with the semantic definition, and we identify expressive fragments that are particularly useful for resource-bounded agents. Third, we introduce full operational semantics that extend CAN, a popular semantics for BDI, to establish how reasoning about uncertainty can be tightly integrated into the BDI framework. Fourth, we provide comprehensive experimental results to highlight the usefulness and feasibility of our approach, and explain how the generic epistemic state can be instantiated into various representations.

scholarly journals Changing Minds ― Epistemic Interventions in Causal Reasoning

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
David Lagnado
Keyword(s):  
Allergic Reaction ◽  
Causal Reasoning ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Counterfactual Reasoning ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
Epistemic Actions ◽  
Causal Action ◽  
Epistemic Context ◽  
Future Outcomes ◽  
Causal Cognition

Did Tom’s use of nuts in the dish cause Billy’s allergic reaction? According to counterfactual theories of causation, an agent is judged a cause to the extent that their action made a difference to the outcome (Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2020; Gerstenberg, Halpern, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Halpern, 2016; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009). In this paper, we argue for the integration of epistemic states into current counterfactual accounts of causation. In the case of ignorant causal agents, we demonstrate that people’s counterfactual reasoning primarily targets the agent’s epistemic state – what the agent doesn’t know –, and their epistemic actions – what they could have done to know – rather than the agent’s actual causal action. In four experiments, we show that people’s causal judgment as well as their reasoning about alternatives is sensitive to the epistemic conditions of a causal agent: Knowledge vs. ignorance (Experiment 1), self-caused vs. externally caused ignorance (Experiment 2), the number of epistemic actions (Experiment 3), and the epistemic context (Experiment 4). We see two advantages in integrating epistemic states into causal models and counterfactual frameworks. First, assuming the intervention on indirect, epistemic causes might allow us to explain why people attribute decreased causality to ignorant vs. knowing causal agents. Moreover, causal agents’ epistemic states pick out those factors that can be controlled or manipulated in order to achieve desirable future outcomes, reflecting the forward-looking dimension of causality. We discuss our findings in the broader context of moral and causal cognition.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document