Changing Minds ― Epistemic Interventions in Causal Reasoning

Did Tom’s use of nuts in the dish cause Billy’s allergic reaction? According to counterfactual theories of causation, an agent is judged a cause to the extent that their action made a difference to the outcome (Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum, 2020; Gerstenberg, Halpern, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Halpern, 2016; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009). In this paper, we argue for the integration of epistemic states into current counterfactual accounts of causation. In the case of ignorant causal agents, we demonstrate that people’s counterfactual reasoning primarily targets the agent’s epistemic state – what the agent doesn’t know –, and their epistemic actions – what they could have done to know – rather than the agent’s actual causal action. In four experiments, we show that people’s causal judgment as well as their reasoning about alternatives is sensitive to the epistemic conditions of a causal agent: Knowledge vs. ignorance (Experiment 1), self-caused vs. externally caused ignorance (Experiment 2), the number of epistemic actions (Experiment 3), and the epistemic context (Experiment 4). We see two advantages in integrating epistemic states into causal models and counterfactual frameworks. First, assuming the intervention on indirect, epistemic causes might allow us to explain why people attribute decreased causality to ignorant vs. knowing causal agents. Moreover, causal agents’ epistemic states pick out those factors that can be controlled or manipulated in order to achieve desirable future outcomes, reflecting the forward-looking dimension of causality. We discuss our findings in the broader context of moral and causal cognition.

Two-dimensional area and matter flux in the theory of causal fermion systems

The notions of two-dimensional area, Killing fields and matter flux are introduced in the setting of causal fermion systems. It is shown that for critical points of the causal action, the area change of two-dimensional surfaces under a Killing flow in null directions is proportional to the matter flux through these surfaces. This relation generalizes an equation in classical general relativity due to Ted Jacobson setting of causal fermion systems.

Causal judgments about atypical actions are influenced by agents’ epistemic states

A prominent finding in causal cognition research is people's tendency to attribute increased causality to atypical actions. If two agents jointly cause an outcome ("conjunctive causation’"), but differ in how frequently they have performed the causal action before, people judge the atypically acting agent to have caused the outcome to a greater extent than the normally acting agent. In this paper, we argue that it is the epistemic state of an abnormally acting agent, rather than the abnormality of their action, that is driving people's causal judgments. Given the predictability of the normally acting agent's behaviour, the abnormal agent is in a better position to foresee the consequences of their action. We put this hypothesis to test in four experiments. In Experiment 1, we show that people judge the atypical agent as more causal than the normally acting agent, but also perceive an epistemic advantage of the abnormal agent. In Experiment 2, we find that people do not judge a causal difference if there is no epistemic asymmetry between the agents. In Experiment 3, we replicate these findings for a scenario in which the abnormal agent's epistemic advantage generalises to a novel context. In Experiment 4, we extend these findings to mental states more broadly construed. We develop a Bayesian Network model that predicts the degree of mental states based on action normality and epistemic states, and find that people infer mental states like desire and intentions to a greater extent from abnormal behaviour. We discuss these results in light of current theories and research on people’s preference for atypical causes.

Evidence for a dissociation between causal beliefs and instrumental actions

Human experiments have demonstrated that instrumental performance of an action and the causal beliefs of the effectiveness of an action in producing a reward are correlated and controlled by the probability of an action leading to a reward. The animal literature, however, shows that instrumental performance under free-operant training differs even when the reward probabilities are matched while subjects undergo training under ratio or interval schedules of reward. In two experiments, we investigated whether causal beliefs would correlate with instrumental performance under ratio and interval schedules for matched reward probabilities. In both experiments, we found that performance was higher under ratio than under interval training. However, causal beliefs were similar between these two conditions despite these differences in instrumental performance. When reward probabilities were increased by experimental manipulations in Experiment 2, the causal beliefs increased but performance decreased with respect to Experiment 1. This is evidence that instrumental performance and causal action-reward attribution may not follow from the same psychological process under free-operant training.

Evidence for a dissociation between causal beliefs and instrumental actions

Human experiments have demonstrated that instrumental performance of an action and the causal beliefs of the effectiveness of an action in producing a reward are correlated and controlled by the probability of an action leading to a reward. The animal literature, however, shows that instrumental performance under free-operant training differs even when these reward probabilities are matched while subjects undergo training under ratio or interval schedules of reward. In two experiments, we investigated whether causal beliefs would correlate with instrumental performance under interval and ratio schedules for matched reward probabilities. In both experiments we found that performance was higher under ratio than under interval training. However, causal beliefs were similar between these two conditions despite these differences in instrumental performance. When reward probabilities were increased by experimental manipulations in Experiment 2, the causal beliefs increased but performance decreased with respect to Experiment 1. This is evidence that instrumental performance and causal action-reward attribution may not follow from the same psychological process under free-operant training.

Self-Determination

Self-determination refers to self- (vs. other-) caused action—to people acting volitionally. “Human agency” refers to the sense of personal empowerment involving both knowing and having what it takes to achieve goals. Human agentic theories share the view that organismic aspirations drive human behaviors. An “organismic” perspective of self-determination that views people as active contributors to, or authors of, their behavior provides a foundation for examining and facilitating the degree to which people become self-determined and the impact of that on their pursuit of well-being. An organismic approach requires a focus on the interface between the self and context. This chapter discusses the self-determination construct within an organismic perspective, surveys the construct’s history and usage in philosophy and psychology, summarizes theories of motivation and causal action, and provides a framework for understanding its development. Research implications based upon existing knowledge and research in self-determination and positive psychology are identified.