Recruitment of newly acquired category exemplars into unconscious processing systems is rapid and durable

2021 ◽  
Vol 95 ◽  
pp. 103205
Author(s):  
Reed M. Morgan ◽  
Richard L. Abrams
2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisabeth Norman

A series of vignette examples taken from psychological research on motivation, emotion, decision making, and attitudes illustrates how the influence of unconscious processes is often measured in a range of different behaviors. However, the selected studies share an apparent lack of explicit operational definition of what is meant by consciousness, and there seems to be substantial disagreement about the properties of conscious versus unconscious processing: Consciousness is sometimes equated with attention, sometimes with verbal report ability, and sometimes operationalized in terms of behavioral dissociations between different performance measures. Moreover, the examples all seem to share a dichotomous view of conscious and unconscious processes as being qualitatively different. It is suggested that cognitive research on consciousness can help resolve the apparent disagreement about how to define and measure unconscious processing, as is illustrated by a selection of operational definitions and empirical findings from modern cognitive psychology. These empirical findings also point to the existence of intermediate states of conscious awareness, not easily classifiable as either purely conscious or purely unconscious. Recent hypotheses from cognitive psychology, supplemented with models from social, developmental, and clinical psychology, are then presented all of which are compatible with the view of consciousness as a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. Such a view of consciousness would open up for explorations of intermediate states of awareness in addition to more purely conscious or purely unconscious states and thereby increase our understanding of the seemingly “unconscious” aspects of mental life.


2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Pitts ◽  
Mark R. Klinger

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Bernat ◽  
Scott Bunce ◽  
Howard Shevrin ◽  
Stephen Hibbard ◽  
Mike Snodgrass

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Dominik Guss ◽  
Jarrett Evans ◽  
Devon Murray ◽  
Harald Schaub

Author(s):  
Marina Baroni ◽  
Sergio Frumento ◽  
Valentina Cesari ◽  
Angelo Gemignani ◽  
Danilo Menicucci ◽  
...  

1988 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Groeger

The suggestion that semantic activation can occur without conscious identification of the priming stimulus is still controversial. Many studies supporting such a contention, especially those where primes were auditorially presented, suffer from methodological shortcomings, frequently with regard to threshold measurement. In the study reported here 24 subjects underwent a considerably more rigorous thresholding procedure than has been usual, prior to engaging in a forced-choice sentence completion task. The results show that semantic priming operates when subjects were unable to detect the presence of primes and that phonological (but not semantic) priming operates when the primes were invariably detected but never correctly identified. The relevance of these qualitatively different effects of primes, as a function of the level at which they are presented, in discussed in the light of recent accounts of unconscious processing.


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