Unconscious Knowledge Produces Adaptive Decisions via Conscious Judgments in a Novel Instrumental Conditioning Paradigm

The demonstration of unconscious instrumental conditioning (i.e., unconsciously learning to choose stimuli that lead to rewards) is central for the tenet that unconscious learning supports human adaptation. Recent studies, using reliable subliminal conditioning procedures, have found evidence against unconscious instrumental conditioning. The present preregistered study proposes an alternative paradigm, in which unconscious processing is stimulated not by the subliminal exposure of the predictive (conditioned) stimuli, but by employing predictive regularities that are complex and difficult to detect consciously. Participants (N = 211) were exposed to letter strings that, unknown to them, were built from two complex artificial grammars: an “rewarded’’ or a “non-rewarded” grammar. On each trial, participants memorized a string, and subsequently had to discriminate the memorized string from a distractor. Correct discriminations were rewarded only when the identified string followed the rewarded grammar, but not when it followed the non-rewarded grammar. In a subsequent test phase, participants were presented with new strings from the rewarded and from the unrewarded grammar. Their task was now to directly choose the strings from the rewarded grammar, in order to collect more rewards. Employing a trial-by-trial awareness measure widely used in implicit learning, we found that participants accurately choose novel strings from the rewarded grammar when they had no conscious knowledge of the grammar. The awareness measure also showed that participants were accurate only when the unconsciously learned grammar led to conscious judgments. The present study provides an alternative to subliminal conditioning paradigms and shows evidence for unconscious instrumental conditioning.

Fast unconscious processing of emotional stimuli in early stages of the visual cortex

Several cortical and subcortical brain areas have been reported to be sensitive to the emotional content of subliminal stimuli. However, the timing of these activations remains unclear. Our scope was to detect the earliest cortical traces of visual unconscious processing by recording event-related potentials (ERPs) from 43 participants. Subliminal spiders (emotional) and wheels (neutral), sharing similar low-level visual parameters, were presented at two different locations (fixation and periphery). The differential (peak to peak) amplitude from CP1 (77 milliseconds from stimulus onset) to C2 (100 milliseconds), two early visual ERP components originated in V1/V2 according to source localization analyses, was analyzed via Bayesian and traditional analyses. Spiders elicited greater CP1-C2 amplitudes than wheels when presented at fixation. This fast effect of subliminal stimulation -not reported previously to the best of our knowledge- has implications in several debates: i) the amygdala cannot be mediating these effects, ii) latency of other evaluative structures recently proposed, such as the visual thalamus, is compatible with these results, iii) the absence of peripheral stimuli effects points to a relevant role of the parvocellular visual system in unconscious processing.

No overlap between unconscious and imagined representations

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex. However, while representations during imagery are indeed only caused by feedback processing, neural processing during perception is an interplay of both feedforward and feedback processing. This means that any overlap could be due to overlap in feedback processes. In the current study we aimed to investigate this issue by characterizing the overlap between feedforward- and feedback-initiated category-representations during imagery, conscious perception and unconscious processing using fMRI. While all three conditions elicited stimulus representations in left lateral occipital cortex (LOC), significant similarities were only observed between imagery and conscious perception in this area. Furthermore, PPI-analyses revealed stronger connectivity between frontal areas and left LOC during conscious perception and imagery compared to unconscious processing. Together, these findings can be explained by the idea that long-range feedback modifies visual representations, thereby reducing neural overlap between purely feedforward and feedback-initiated stimulus representations measured by fMRI. Neural representations caused by feedback, either stimulus-driven (perception) or internally-driven (imagery), are however relatively similar.

Number processing outside awareness? Systematically testing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures of consciousness

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.