Do financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation to perform on standardized tests?

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 125-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. List ◽  
Jeffrey A. Livingston ◽  
Susanne Neckermann
2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
TL Zutlevics

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 194-209
Author(s):  
Jongmin Shon ◽  
Gregory A. Porumbescu ◽  
Robert K. Christensen

Author(s):  
James Pattison

This chapter considers the use of economic, political, and legal incentives. After presenting three notable reasons for using positive incentives—including the fact that they are not coercive—it considers several objections to their use. These include, centrally, the worry that they reward those who commit egregious wrongdoing and therefore are problematic in terms of desert. It also considers the potential moral hazard that such inducements will encourage others to commit wrongdoing and the potential for incentives to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation and to undermine morally valuable international norms and laws. Although the chapter largely defends the case for positive incentives, it rejects the case for international amnesties and exile.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 789-805 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHERINE CURCHIN

AbstractInternationally the payment of welfare benefits is increasingly being made conditional on recipients’ behaviour. Behavioural conditions and the payments to which they apply are diversifying. This article aims to contribute to the debate among scholars and policymakers over the ethics of welfare conditionality. While other assessments of the ethics of welfare conditionality have focused on the potential harm caused to vulnerable welfare recipients, this paper develops the argument that welfare conditionality is illiberal. Drawing on findings from behavioural science, it argues that relying on extrinsic motivation in the form of financial incentives is a less desirable approach to behavioural change than bolstering intrinsic motivation. The argument is illustrated with the case of the Australian ‘No Jab, No Pay’ policy, under which family payments and childcare subsidies are denied to parents whose children are not fully immunised. As behavioural conditions and the payments to which they are applied diversify, the cumulative effects of these conditions pose an underappreciated threat to citizens’ autonomy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-213
Author(s):  
Jinhua Zhao ◽  
◽  
John M. Kerr ◽  
Maria Knight Lapinski ◽  
Robert Shupp ◽  
...  

We link the reciprocity model of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with the theory of normative social behavior to study how financial incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation in both the short and long runs. Using data from a lab-based repeated public goods game, we find strong evidence in support of the reciprocity model and crowding out effects both when the payment is in place and after it stops. When the payment program is in place, subjects become less sensitive to reciprocity, perceive less kindness in others’ contributions, and care less about others’ welfare. The overall decrease in motivation to reciprocate reduces the effectiveness of the payment program by almost 50%. About 20% of the crowding out effect persists after the payment stops, and the reciprocity mechanism explains over three quarters of the long-run crowding out effect.


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