scholarly journals A test of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty

2012 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 304-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad R. Humphreys ◽  
Brian P. Soebbing
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Garcia ◽  
Jun Honda ◽  
Maarten Janssen

We study vertical relations in markets with consumer and retailer search. We obtain three important new results. First, we provide a novel explanation for price dispersion that does not depend on some form of heterogeneity among consumers. Price dispersion takes on the form of a bimodal distribution. Second, under competitive conditions (many retailers or small consumer search cost), social welfare is significantly smaller than in the double marginalization outcome. Manufacturers' regular price is significantly above the monopoly price, squeezing retailers' markups and providing an alternative explanation for incomplete cost pass-through. Third, firms' prices are decreasing in consumer search cost. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D83, L13, L60, L81)


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian P. Soebbing ◽  
Nicholas M. Watanabe

Price dispersion reflects ignorance in the marketplace in which different prices exist from the same or different sellers for a similar good. One of the sources of price dispersion is uncertain demand for a business’s good or service. Ticket markets are good opportunities to examine a firm’s pricing strategy under demand uncertainty, because professional sports teams have to price their tickets well in advance of the actual event and before actual demand is known. The purpose of the present research is to examine the relationship between price dispersion and regular season average attendance in Major League Baseball. Using a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) model, the present research finds that an increase in price dispersion leads to a decrease in average attendance.


Author(s):  
James Peck ◽  
Jeevant Rampal

This paper analyzes a monopoly firm’s profit-maximizing mechanism in the following context. There is a continuum of consumers with a unit demand for a good. The distribution of the consumers’ valuations is given by one of two possible demand distributions/states. The consumers are uncertain about the demand state, and they update their beliefs after observing their own valuation for the good. The firm is uncertain about the demand state but infers it from the consumers’ reported valuations. The firm’s problem is to maximize profits by choosing an optimal mechanism among the class of anonymous, deterministic, direct revelation mechanisms that satisfy interim incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality. We show that, under certain sufficient conditions, the firm’s optimal mechanism is to set the monopoly price in each demand state. Under these conditions, Segal’s optimal ex post mechanism is robust to relaxing ex post incentive compatibility to interim incentive compatibility.


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