The Effect of Price Dispersion on Major League Baseball Team Attendance

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian P. Soebbing ◽  
Nicholas M. Watanabe

Price dispersion reflects ignorance in the marketplace in which different prices exist from the same or different sellers for a similar good. One of the sources of price dispersion is uncertain demand for a business’s good or service. Ticket markets are good opportunities to examine a firm’s pricing strategy under demand uncertainty, because professional sports teams have to price their tickets well in advance of the actual event and before actual demand is known. The purpose of the present research is to examine the relationship between price dispersion and regular season average attendance in Major League Baseball. Using a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) model, the present research finds that an increase in price dispersion leads to a decrease in average attendance.

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (7) ◽  
pp. 875-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Mares ◽  
Emily Blackburn

Hosting professional sports teams is often seen as a financial benefit for cities. In the following analysis, we provide evidence that sports teams also carry costs. The analysis, the first examining a Major League Baseball team, finds significant increases in a variety of crimes during home game days of the St. Louis Cardinals. Adjusting for attendance and game length, this study finds that larcenies, motor vehicle thefts, minor assaults, disorderly conduct, and destruction of property increase in volume during game days. Increases concentrate especially around the immediate stadium area, but some are also observable in citywide levels of crime. Additionally, this study examines differences between the time of day a game is played and games played against its historic rival, the Chicago Cubs.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul G. Schempp ◽  
Bryan A. McCullick ◽  
Matthew A. Grant ◽  
Cornell Foo ◽  
Kelly Wieser

The purpose of this study was to analyze the relationship between coaches’ professional playing experience and their professional coaching success. The sample (n = 134) included coaches who had the equivalent of three full seasons of head coaching experience in either Major League Baseball (MLB) (n = 46), the National Basketball Association (NBA) (n = 38) or the National Football League (NFL) (n = 50) as determined by the total number of games coached between the years 1997-2007. ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between coaches with more or less professional playing experience and professional coaching success as determined by professional winning percentage. Further, no significant relationship was found between professional playing experience and professional coaching success in MLB (r = -0.16), NBA (r = -0.05) or NFL (r = 0.00). It was concluded that professional playing experience was not a predictor of professional level coaching success. These findings support the notion that sources of knowledge other than playing experience may be necessary and useful in developing coaching expertise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane Rockerbie ◽  
Stephen Easton

Revenue sharing is a common league policy in professional sports leagues. Several motivations for revenue sharing have been explored in the literature, including supporting small market teams, affecting league parity, suppressing player salaries, and improving team profitability. We investigate a different motivation. Risk-averse team owners, through their commissioner, are able to increase their utility by using revenue sharing to affect higher order moments of the revenue distribution. In particular, it may reduce the variance and kurtosis, as well as affecting the skewness of the league distribution of team local revenues. We first determine the extent to which revenue sharing affects these moments in theory, then we quantify the effects on utility for Major League Baseball over the period 2002–2013. Our results suggest that revenue sharing produced significant utility gains at little cost, which enhanced the positive effects noted by other studies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-277
Author(s):  
Bill Anderson

Antonio Gramsci argued that ruling classes stayed in power as much through cultural hegemony as through economic hegemony or brute force. Gramsci maintained that the dominant class established and maintained this cultural hegemony through negotiation and persuasion. Gramsci’s theory offers much to sport communication scholars who try to ascertain why certain communities (especially their civic leaders) build stadiums to attract major-league sports teams and events despite mounting economic evidence that these ventures often fail to yield the financial benefits touted by their advocates. This paper uses Gramsci’s theory to examine how the civic leaders of Atlanta enticed the populace and sporting press to use public funds to build a new sports stadium in the mid-1960s. Atlanta’s leaders used the sports stadium not only to lure a Major League Baseball team to the city but also to persuade the city’s populace that this move made the metropolis “big league.”


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