scholarly journals Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

2017 ◽  
Vol 150 ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
David Rowell ◽  
Son Hong Nghiem ◽  
Luke B. Connelly
2012 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zelalem Yilma ◽  
Luuk van Kempen ◽  
Thomas de Hoop

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fajar Nurhaditia Putra

AbstrakPenelitian ini memberikan kontribusi berupa studi empiris ex ante moral hazard pada Sistem Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) di Indonesia. Kami menemukan bahwa kepemilikan Program JKN memiliki hubungan negatif dengan aktivitas fisik dan hubungan positif dengan pengeluran rokok individu. Selanjutnya dengan menghitung efek marginal kami mendapatkan bahwa Program JKN mengurangi probabilitas individu untuk melakukan aktivitas fisik sebesar 2.7% dan mengurangi intensitas melakukan aktivitas fisik. Program JKN juga ditemukan berhubungan positif pengeluaran rokok individu bagi perokok. Hasil analisis menyatakan bahwa ada indikasi terjadinya ex ante moral hazard pada Program JKN karena terdapat hubungan yang positif antara kepemilikan JKN dan probabilitas individu melakukan perilaku kesehatan berisiko seperti aktivitas fisik dan perilaku merokok.Abstract This paper contributes to the empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard on the National Health Insurance System (NHIS) in Indonesia. We find that JKN participation has a negative relationship with physical activity and positive relationship with smoking spending. Furthermore, by calculating marginal effect we obtained that JKN participation reduce the probability of physical activity by 2.7% and also reduce the intensity of individual physical activity. For the smoker, JKN Participation is expected increase in their spending for smoking. The result indicates that there is an evidence of ex ante moral hazard since there is a positive relationship between JKN participation and risky health behaviors such as physical activity and smoking behavior.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Ji Luo ◽  
Yuanxiang Zhou

How individual characters affect the ex ante moral hazard of basic medical insurance still remain academically debatable. This paper based on divergent individual characters of insurers to analyze the roles of basic health insurance on the ex ante moral hazard. It found health level, marital status, income level and age are the key individual factors affecting ex ante moral hazard of basic health insurance. But the roles of rural-urban difference and gender are not obvious. It gives supplementary explanations to the medical service expenditure, waste of medical resources and other issues, and also put forward the corresponding policy recommendations.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jay Bhattacharya ◽  
Mikko Packalen

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