Methods to predict variations of lower explosion limit associated with hybrid mixtures of flammable gas and dust

Fuel ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 122138
Author(s):  
Wentao Ji ◽  
Yang Wang ◽  
Jingjing Yang ◽  
Jia He ◽  
Xiaoping Wen ◽  
...  
2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Kwasi Addai ◽  
Dieter Gabel ◽  
Ulrich Krause

2019 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 296-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zaheer Abbas ◽  
Ronald Zinke ◽  
Dieter Gabel ◽  
Emmanuel Kwasi Addai ◽  
Ardalan Fakhr Darbanan ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Kwasi Addai ◽  
Haider Ali ◽  
Paul Amyotte ◽  
Ulrich Krause

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 497-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Kwasi Addai ◽  
Dieter Gabel ◽  
Ulrich Krause

Crop Science ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 645-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. L. Thompson
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1669 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf K. Eckhoff ◽  
Gang Li

This paper first addresses the question: what is a dust explosion? Afterwards, some specific issues are briefly reviewed: materials that can give dust explosions, factors influencing ignitability and explosibility of dust clouds, the combustion of dust clouds in air, ignition sources that can initiate dust explosions, primary and secondary dust explosions, dust flash fires, explosions of “hybrid mixtures”, and detonation of dust clouds. Subsequently, measures for dust explosion prevention and mitigation are reviewed. The next section presents the case history of an industrial dust explosion catastrophe in China in 2014. In the final section, a brief review is given of some current research issues that are related to the prevention and mitigation of dust explosions. There is a constant need for further research and development in all the areas elucidated in the paper.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Leishear

Water hammers, or fluid transients, compress flammable gasses to their autognition temperatures in piping systems to cause fires or explosions. While this statement may be true for many industrial systems, the focus of this research are reactor coolant water systems (RCW) in nuclear power plants, which generate flammable gasses during normal operations and during accident conditions, such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA’s) or reactor meltdowns. When combustion occurs, the gas will either burn (deflagrate) or explode, depending on the system geometry and the quantity of the flammable gas and oxygen. If there is sufficient oxygen inside the pipe during the compression process, an explosion can ignite immediately. If there is insufficient oxygen to initiate combustion inside the pipe, the flammable gas can only ignite if released to air, an oxygen rich environment. This presentation considers the fundamentals of gas compression and causes of ignition in nuclear reactor systems. In addition to these ignition mechanisms, specific applications are briefly considered. Those applications include a hydrogen fire following the Three Mile Island meltdown, hydrogen explosions following Fukushima Daiichi explosions, and on-going fires and explosions in U.S nuclear power plants. Novel conclusions are presented here as follows. 1. A hydrogen fire was ignited by water hammer at Three Mile Island. 2. Hydrogen explosions were ignited by water hammer at Fukushima Daiichi. 3. Piping damages in U.S. commercial nuclear reactor systems have occurred since reactors were first built. These damages were not caused by water hammer alone, but were caused by water hammer compression of flammable hydrogen and resultant deflagration or detonation inside of the piping.


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