GTSIM-POP: Game theory based secure incentive mechanism and patient-optimized privacy-preserving packet forwarding scheme in m-healthcare social networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 70-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Zhou ◽  
Zhenfu Cao ◽  
Xiaolei Dong ◽  
Thanos Vasilakos
2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (6) ◽  
pp. 9707-9721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoying Gan ◽  
Yuqing Li ◽  
Yixuan Huang ◽  
Luoyi Fu ◽  
Xinbing Wang

Author(s):  
Zhuang Xiong ◽  
Pengju Wang ◽  
Chengxia Wu

AbstractInnovation failure knowledge sharing plays an important role in reducing the probability of repeated failure of subsequent innovation and improving innovation ability of virtual research organization. However, it is very difficult for members to actively share the innovation failure knowledge without incentives. To promote the sharing behavior of innovation failure knowledge in virtual research organization, by using game theory, considering the risk aversion degree of members and the negative effect of fault-tolerance environment, the incentive model of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization was constructed, the incentive relationship of innovation failure knowledge sharing between organization and its members under the influence of different states was analyzed, and the theoretical model was simulated and verified through a case study from China. Results show that: (1) without considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, the optimal incentive coefficient of innovation failure knowledge sharing is positively related to the shareable rate and the transformation ability of innovation failure knowledge of members, and negatively related to the sharing cost and risk aversion degree of members; (2) considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, virtual research organization should make a corresponding modification of sharing incentive intensity according to the estimation of tolerance degree to fault-tolerant environment by itself and its members, so as to reduce the knowledge input of organization. The findings obtained from this study provide a novel idea and method for the design of incentive mechanism of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoguang Niu ◽  
Jiawei Wang ◽  
Qiongzan Ye ◽  
Yihao Zhang

The proliferation of mobile devices has facilitated the prevalence of participatory sensing applications in which participants collect and share information in their environments. The design of a participatory sensing application confronts two challenges: “privacy” and “incentive” which are two conflicting objectives and deserve deeper attention. Inspired by physical currency circulation system, this paper introduces the notion of E-cent, an exchangeable unit bearer currency. Participants can use the E-cent to take part in tasks anonymously. By employing E-cent, we propose an E-cent-based privacy-preserving incentive mechanism, called EPPI. As a dynamic balance regulatory mechanism, EPPI can not only protect the privacy of participant, but also adjust the whole system to the ideal situation, under which the rated tasks can be finished at minimal cost. To the best of our knowledge, EPPI is the first attempt to build an incentive mechanism while maintaining the desired privacy in participatory sensing systems. Extensive simulation and analysis results show that EPPI can achieve high anonymity level and remarkable incentive effects.


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