Nesting of asymmetric functions in skilled bimanual action: Dynamics of hammering behavior of bead craftsmen

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tetsushi Nonaka ◽  
Blandine Bril
2016 ◽  
Vol 123 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry S. Harrison ◽  
Michael T. Turvey ◽  
Till D. Frank

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santiago Garcia-Guerrero ◽  
Denis O'Hora ◽  
Arkady Zgonnikov ◽  
Stefan Scherbaum

Approach-avoidance conflict is observed in the competing motivations towards the benefits and away from the costs of a decision. The current study employs the action dynamics of response motion, via mouse-tracking, in an attempt to characterize the continuous dynamic resolution of such conflicts. Approach-avoidance conflict (AAC) was generated by varying the appetitive consequences of a decision (i.e., point rewards and shorter participation time) in the presence of a simultaneous aversive consequence (i.e., shock probability). In two experiments, we found that AAC differentially affected response trajectories. Overall, approach trajectories were less complex than avoidance trajectories. As approach and avoidance motivations neared equipotentiality, response trajectories were more deflected from the shortest route to the eventual choice. Consistency in the location of approach and avoidance response options reduced variability in performance enabling more sensitive estimates of dynamic conflict. The time course of competing influences on response trajectories including trial-to-trial effects and conflict between approach and avoidance were estimated using regression analyses. We discuss these findings in terms of a dynamic theory of approach-avoidance that we hope will lead to insights of practical relevance in the field of maladaptive avoidance.


2009 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Chi Chen ◽  
Yunshyong Chow

In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.


2018 ◽  
Vol 75 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filip Malawski ◽  
Bogdan Kwolek

2020 ◽  
Vol 148 (4) ◽  
pp. 2655-2655
Author(s):  
Miran Oh ◽  
Yoonjeong Lee
Keyword(s):  

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