Do cap-and-trade policies drive environmental and social goals in supply chains: Strategic decisions, collaboration, and contract choices

2020 ◽  
Vol 223 ◽  
pp. 107537 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mithu Rani Kuiti ◽  
Debabrata Ghosh ◽  
Preetam Basu ◽  
Arnab Bisi
Author(s):  
Zahra Homayouni ◽  
Mir Saman Pishvaee ◽  
Hamed Jahani ◽  
Dmitry Ivanov

AbstractAdoption of carbon regulation mechanisms facilitates an evolution toward green and sustainable supply chains followed by an increased complexity. Through the development and usage of a multi-choice goal programming model solved by an improved algorithm, this article investigates sustainability strategies for carbon regulations mechanisms. We first propose a sustainable logistics model that considers assorted vehicle types and gas emissions involved with product transportation. We then construct a bi-objective model that minimizes total cost as the first objective function and follows environmental considerations in the second one. With our novel robust-heuristic optimization approach, we seek to support the decision-makers in comparison and selection of carbon emission policies in supply chains in complex settings with assorted vehicle types, demand and economic uncertainty. We deploy our model in a case-study to evaluate and analyse two carbon reduction policies, i.e., carbon-tax and cap-and-trade policies. The results demonstrate that our robust-heuristic methodology can efficiently deal with demand and economic uncertainty, especially in large-scale problems. Our findings suggest that governmental incentives for a cap-and-trade policy would be more effective for supply chains in lowering pollution by investing in cleaner technologies and adopting greener practices.


Author(s):  
Tamás Brányi ◽  
László Józsa ◽  
Erika Seres-Huszárik

Beszállító, gyártó és vevő vállalatok alkotnak egy ellátási láncot. Optimális esetben a vállalatok integrált rendszerben működnek, az együttműködés bizal mi alapon nyugszik, így a közös stratégiai döntések révén versenyképes lesz a lánc. Az ellátási láncban lehet egy kulcsfontosságú vállalat, amelyik domináns hatalmi pozícióval rendelkezik. A kutatás célja, hogy feltárja a hatalommal rendelkező vállalat szerepét a partnercégek és az ellátási lánc versenyképességének alakulásában. A szakirodalom alapján a hipotézis feltételezi, hogy van kapcsolat a versenyképesség és a domináns vállalat szerepvállalása között. A szerzők elemzése primer kutatáson alapul, a kérdőív válaszait SPSS statisztikai kiértékeléssel végezték. Az eredmények azt mutatták, hogy a domináns vállalat versenyképességétől valóban függ a partnercégek versenyképessége. Szignifikáns kapcsolat megléte bizonyítja a hipotézist. A vizsgálatok kiemelik, hogy a verseny már egy szinttel feljebb, az ellátási lánc szintjén értelmezhető: globális ellátási láncok versenyeznek egymással. _____ Supplier, producer and buyer companies make up a supply chain. In an optimal case the companies are integrated, partnership rests on trust which results in common strategic decisions leading to competitiveness. Each supply chain has a key company with dominant power position. The objective of the research is to analyse how the company with power affects competitiveness of partner firms and the supply chain as a whole. Based on theories hypothesis assumes a link between competitiveness and power position and its influence. Methodology of the analysis is based on primary research; the authors used SPSS statistical analysis to evaluate the answers of questionnaire. Findings include that partner firms’ competitiveness rely on competitiveness of the company with dominant power position. Significant connections prove that the hypothesis is true. Results show that competitiveness is being moved up to supply chain level. Global supply chains compete with each other.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 113-118
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Aldy ◽  
Sarah Armitage

While a firm knows the carbon price with certainty under a tax, it must form an expectation about future allowance prices to identify its cost-effective abatement investment under a capand-trade program. We illustrate graphically how errors in forming this expectation increase the costs of irreversible pollution abatement investment under cap-and-trade relative to a tax. We describe empirical “cost-effectiveness anomalies” in allowance markets that may be attributed to cap-and-trade's inherent uncertainty. We model investment under simulated US carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies and find that allowance price uncertainty can increase resource costs 20 percent for a given quantity of emission abatement.


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