scholarly journals Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 327-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Fullerton ◽  
Gilbert E Metcalf
2020 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 113-118
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Aldy ◽  
Sarah Armitage

While a firm knows the carbon price with certainty under a tax, it must form an expectation about future allowance prices to identify its cost-effective abatement investment under a capand-trade program. We illustrate graphically how errors in forming this expectation increase the costs of irreversible pollution abatement investment under cap-and-trade relative to a tax. We describe empirical “cost-effectiveness anomalies” in allowance markets that may be attributed to cap-and-trade's inherent uncertainty. We model investment under simulated US carbon tax and cap-and-trade policies and find that allowance price uncertainty can increase resource costs 20 percent for a given quantity of emission abatement.


Subject The impact of Ontario's decision to adopt a cap-and-trade system. Significance The Ontario provincial government will introduce a cap-and-trade system in the province by joining Quebec and California's carbon-trading market. Ontario is Canada's fourth province to implement a form of carbon-pricing; once it is in place, jurisdictions responsible for 80% of Canada's emissions will have some kind of carbon pricing. The joint carbon market with Quebec will also cover more than half of the Canadian population. Impacts The joint system may facilitate Californian companies' entry into the Canadian market. Success in raising money through the system may encourage other cash-strapped US states to join. Support for climate change policies could become a wedge issue in the federal elections in October, to Harper's detriment.


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