Product return management: Linking product returns, closed-loop supply chain activities and the effectiveness of the reverse supply chains

2017 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 1144-1156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohd Rizaimy Shaharudin ◽  
Kannan Govindan ◽  
Suhaiza Zailani ◽  
Keah Choon Tan ◽  
Mohammad Iranmanesh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Product Returns ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Product Return ◽  
Reverse Supply Chains ◽  
Product Return Management

scholarly journals Who Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretical Analysis of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Different Power Structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (7) ◽  
pp. 2274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Innovation Strategy ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Innovation Strategies ◽  
Market Leadership

As awareness of environmental protection increases worldwide, enterprises have been building their supply chains in ways that conserve natural resources and minimize the creation of pollutants. One of the practical ways to make supply chains more sustainable is for enterprises to utilize green innovation strategies and to increase resource reuse. In this work, we focus on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a collector. In the investigated CLSC, the manufacturer and the retailer drive the green innovation strategy either individually or simultaneously to boost market demand. In the reverse flow of the CLSC, the collector is responsible for collecting consumers’ used products and transferring them to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. By combining two types of the market leadership and three types of green innovation strategies, we establish six different Stackelberg game models and solve them analytically. Through an extensive comparative analysis, we show who should have market leadership and who should drive the green innovation strategy in the CLSC. Various numerical examples are also given to support our major findings. One of our key findings suggests that the supply chain members must participate in green innovation activities at the same time to achieve a win-win scenario in the CLSC.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Development of cores acquisition model with two switching mechanisms in a retailer-oriented closed-loop supply chain system

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3 (110)) ◽  
pp. 6-15
Author(s):  
Evi Yuliawati ◽  
Pratikto Pratikto ◽  
Sugiono Sugiono ◽  
Oyong Novareza
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Product Returns ◽  
Fixed Rate ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Flat Rate ◽  
Taking Charge ◽  
Rate Mechanism

Retailer-Oriented Closed-Loop Supply Chain (ROCLSC) is an integration of forward and reverse supply chains with retailer taking charge of the remanufacturing, distribution, and collecting activities. This type of mechanism is quite effective, since the majority of product returns management is performed by the retailer. However, in practical industries, the implementation of ROCLSC is still limited. In this study, we investigate a ROCLSC system that involves an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer. OEM plays a role as a producer of new products, while the retailer is in charge of remanufacturing, collecting, as well as selling and distributing both newly manufactured and remanufactured products. We develop a mathematical model to maximize the profit of each party. Although several studies have developed models for cores acquisition, here we apply a different cores switching mechanism. We introduced the fixed rate and flat rate mechanisms used in the business-to-business (B2B) system, where product functions are very important to consumers. In addition, this research focuses on ROCLSC where most of the existing cores acquisition models are Manufacturer-Oriented Closed-Loop Supply Chain (MOCLSC). The result of this study shows that the retailer will get higher profits when the product returns are acquired through the fixed rate mechanism, rather than the flat rate mechanism. Therefore, determining the optimal amount of cores collected through the fixed rate mechanism will increase the retailer’s profit, as well as joint profit of both parties. From the results, we also point out an interesting note that the retailer should increase efforts to sell new products along with the increasing proportion of consumer Willingness to Pay (WTP) for remanufactured products. Hence, both OEM and retailer profits can be increased consecutively

Consumer value considerations and adoption of remanufactured products in closed-loop supply chains

2018 ◽  
Vol 118 (2) ◽  
pp. 480-498 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yacan Wang ◽  
Benjamin T. Hazen ◽  
Diane A. Mollenkopf
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Perceived Risk ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Perceived Value ◽  
Perceived Quality ◽  
Consumer Acceptance ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains

Purpose The success of closed loop supply chains is contingent upon consumer acceptance of remanufactured products, yet little is known about how consumers value such products. The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical grounding for understanding consumers’ value perceptions as related to remanufactured products. Design/methodology/approach Diffusion of innovation theory and customer perceived value literature help form the theoretical model, which is tested empirically using survey data of consumers. Structural equation modeling was employed to test the hypotheses. Findings Perceived value of remanufactured products is measured as a function of perceived benefits (environmental benefits; price advantage) and perceived sacrifices (perceived quality; perceived risk), all of which are shown to impact perceived value. Additionally, perceived risk is found to partially mediate the relationship between perceived quality and perceived value. Originality/value This research makes two significant contributions. First, mid-range theory that is contextualized to the closed loop supply chain is developed to aid researchers and practitioners in better understanding the consumer’s role in the closed loop supply chain, as related to the acceptance of remanufactured products. Second, consumer acceptance of remanufactured products represents a form of supply chain demand risk that has previously been unrecognized. The results provide a foundation for incorporating this type of demand risk in to future research efforts.

Dynamic Pricing Game Under Different Channel Power Structures in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 2050052
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Fang Zhang ◽  
Hui Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Reference Price ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Power ◽  
Advantageous Position

The importance of closed-loop supply chains has been widely recognized both in academic communities and in industrial sectors. This paper starts from the traditional supply chains and the new self-supply chain of GREE to extract realistic problems, to mainly investigating two noncooperative dynamic pricing policies in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, it studies the influence of different channel power structures on dynamic decisions and their complexities. Furthermore, the reference price affects the purchase decisions of consumers. Therefore, the model takes into account the influence of reference price of the market demands. Results show that the manufacturer who opens up a direct channel can make a huge profit in the game. In the dynamic game evolution process, the game leader is in a more advantageous position when the system is in a stable region; once entering into the bifurcating region or chaotic region, the game follower needs to adjust his price to follow the leader’s decision in order to make a profit. In addition, the system’s stable region becomes smaller when the market demand becomes more sensitive to the difference between the reference price and the actual price. In this model, if the manufacturer acts as a leader, he is in a more advantageous position when the market is sensitive to channel competition in the stable stage while the result is opposite in the unstable stage.

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