Robert F. Lusch: Mentor, Collaborator, and Colleague

The author reviews his relationship with Professor Robert F. Lusch, including joint research with some of their doctoral students. Their work addressed questions pertaining to marketing channel power and dependence, channel conflict, and channel member satisfaction as well as contracting among channel member firms.

Research on Reward and Punishment Contract Model and Coordination of Green Supply Chain Based on Fairness Preference

With the increasing demand for “green” goods, it is necessary for companies to develop green innovation to seize market opportunities. Companies often use the model of supply chain cooperation to carry out green innovation. The standard reward and punishment contract model is constructed based on the green degree of the product provided by the supplier when the manufacturer has a fair preference. The impact of the manufacturer’s fairness preference on the green degree of the product, price, manufacturer’s profit, supplier’s profit, and overall profit when the product green degree standard provided by the supplier is greater or smaller than the manufacturer’s demand standard is analyzed. The impact of the difference in channel power between manufacturers and suppliers is also analyzed on the overall profit of the green supply chain. The research results showed that when the manufacturer’s attention to fairness is equal to the attention to self-interest, the overall profit of the green supply chain is the largest, the coordination of the supply chain can be achieved, and the difference in the channel power of the participants in the green supply chain has a significant impact on the overall profit, which is verified by numerical analysis.