This work contributes to the literature on water governance by attempting to provide an answer to the question of what are the differences in efficiency of alternative governance arrangements of water utilities. We test hypotheses derived from property rights, principal–agent, and transaction costs theories using a comprehensive database of 260 water utility systems provided by the Portuguese Regulatory Authority of Water and Waste Services. Using endogenous switching regression models estimated through maximum likelihood, the study is designed in two steps. First, we investigate differences in efficiency between in-house options and externalization and find that in-house solutions as a set (direct provision and municipal companies) are more efficient than externalization options (mixed companies and concessions). Second, we test differences in efficiency within both in-house and externalization solutions, and fail to find statistically significant differences in efficiency between in-house bureaucracies and municipal companies and between mixed companies and concessions.
Estimation of Markov regime-switching regression models with endogenous switching
