Systemic risk, financial contagion and financial fragility

2010 ◽  
Vol 34 (11) ◽  
pp. 2358-2374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serafín Martínez-Jaramillo ◽  
Omar Pérez Pérez ◽  
Fernando Avila Embriz ◽  
Fabrizio López Gallo Dey
Author(s):  
Calixto Lopez-Castañon ◽  
Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo ◽  
Fabrizio Lopez-Gallo

Despite the acknowledgment of the relevance of Systemic Risk, there is a lack of consensus on its definition and, more importantly, on the way it should be measured. Fortunately, there is a growing research agenda and more financial regulators, central bankers, and academics have recently been focusing on this field. In this chapter, the authors obtain a distribution of losses for the banking system as a whole. They are convinced that such distribution of losses is the key element that could be used to develop relevant measures for systemic risk. Their model contemplates several aspects, which they consider important regarding the concept of systemic risk: an initial macroeconomic shock, which weakens some institutions (some of them to the point of failure), a contagion process by means of the interbank market, and the resulting losses to the financial system as a whole. Finally, once the distribution is estimated, the authors derive standard risk measures for the system as a whole, focusing on the tail of the distribution (where the catastrophic or systemic events are located). By using the proposed framework, it is also possible to perform stress testing in a coherent way, including second round effects like contagion through the interbank market. Additionally, it is possible to follow the evolution of certain coherent risk measures, like the CVaR, in order to evaluate if the system is becoming more or less risky, in fact, more or less fragile. Additionally, the authors decompose the distribution of losses of the whole banking system into the systemic and the contagion elements and determine if the system is more prone to experience contagious difficulties during a certain period of time.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Yalan Feng

This paper follows Allen and Gale (2000) to model financial contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon. I assume a two-country economy where banks in each country hold interregional claims on other banks to provide insurance against liquidity preference shocks. The results completely replicate Allen-Gale model. To further test the relative robustness of different market structures I test the implication of moral hazard as in Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007). I find that under certain situation, complete and incomplete structures are equally fragile.


Author(s):  
Serafin Martinez-Jaramillo ◽  
Calixto Lopez-Castañon ◽  
Fabrizio Lopez-Gallo

By using the proposed framework, it is also possible to perform stress testing in a coherent way, including second round effects like contagion through the interbank market. Additionally, it is possible to follow the evolution of certain coherent risk measures, like the CVaR, in order to evaluate if the system is becoming more or less risky, in fact, more or less fragile. Additionally, the authors decompose the distribution of losses of the whole banking system into the systemic and the contagion elements and determine if the system is more prone to experience contagious difficulties during a certain period of time.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 564-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Asuman Ozdaglar ◽  
Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi

This paper argues that the extent of financial contagion exhibits a form of phase transition: as long as the magnitude of negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial network (corresponding to a more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities) enhances financial stability. However, beyond a certain point, dense interconnections serve as a mechanism for the propagation of shocks, leading to a more fragile financial system. Our results thus highlight that the same factors that contribute to resilience under certain conditions may function as significant sources of systemic risk under others. (JEL D85, E44, G21, G28, L14)


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (9) ◽  
pp. 4272-4317
Author(s):  
Markus Brunnermeier ◽  
Simon Rother ◽  
Isabel Schnabel

Abstract We analyze the relationship between asset price bubbles and systemic risk, using bank-level data covering almost 30 years. Banks’ systemic risk already rises during a bubble’s buildup and even more so during its bust. The increase in risk strongly differs across banks and by bubble. It depends on bank characteristics (especially bank size) and bubble characteristics and can become very large: in a median real estate bust, systemic risk increases by almost 70% of the median for banks with unfavorable characteristics. These results emphasize the importance of bank-level factors in the buildup of financial fragility during bubble episodes. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


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