scholarly journals Money and velocity during financial crises: From the great depression to the great recession

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 ◽  
pp. 32-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Anderson ◽  
Michael Bordo ◽  
John V. Duca
2015 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per H. Hansen

Barry Eichengreen's new bookHall of Mirrorsis a detailed, excellent, and somewhat pessimistic comparison of the two most serious financial crises ever—their causes, development, and consequences. Readers well versed in the comprehensive literature on the Great Depression and the Great Recession in the United States and Europe will not find much information inHall of Mirrorsthat is completely new, but most others will. Whatisnew is the comparative approach: the detailed and analytically successful search for similarities and differences between the Great Depression and the Great Recession.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-129
Author(s):  
Eloi Laurent

Put together, my remarks constitute an unsubtle attempt at rendering explicit the elegant implicit comparisons between the Great Depression and today’s “Great recession” that make Alan Brinkley’s article an insightful delight for the reader. At the end of his paper, Brinkley points out to some similarities between the two crises. In the brief following comment, I will push forward his conclusion but on a somewhat different path: in my view, if the consequences of the Great Depression and the “Great Recession” have so far been quite different, their causes appear to be in many respects alike, or at least parallel.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document