Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

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Robust equilibrium strategy for DC pension plan with the return of premiums clauses in a jump-diffusion model

Optimization ◽

10.1080/02331934.2021.1970754 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-30

Author(s):

Hao Chang ◽

Jiaao Li

Keyword(s):

Diffusion Model ◽

Pension Plan ◽

Jump Diffusion ◽

Equilibrium Strategy ◽

Jump Diffusion Model ◽

Robust Equilibrium

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Crisis Learning Games

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1958064 ◽

1988 ◽

Vol 82 (1) ◽

pp. 179-194 ◽

Cited By ~ 20

Author(s):

Russell J. Leng

Keyword(s):

Empirical Study ◽

Complete Information ◽

Cooperative Strategy ◽

Learning Games ◽

Sequential Games ◽

Initial Strategy ◽

Tit For Tat

Findings from a data-based study of bargaining in recurrent crises between evenly matched states provide the foundation for the construction of four crisis-learning games. Symmetrical and asymmetrical nuclear and nonnuclear sequential three-by-three games assuming complete information and nonmyopic play are presented and analyzed. The empirical study indicated that states that were unsuccessful in one crisis were likely to move to more coercive bargaining strategies in the next crisis. The four sequential games offer insights as to why this is likely to produce unwanted consequences, while demonstrating the importance of the participants' initial strategy choices. With the realpolitik lessons suggested by the earlier study removed, the dynamics of the games present a case for beginning with a cooperative strategy and moving to reciprocating, or tit-for-tat, bargaining.

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