Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation

2014 ◽  
Vol 108 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
SEOK-JU CHO
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Robust Equilibrium

This article studies the consequences of strategic voting by outcome-oriented voters in elections under proportional representation (PR). I develop a model of elections under PR, in which voters choose among an arbitrary finite number of parties, and the policy outcome is determined in a postelection bargaining stage. I use a new solution concept, robust equilibrium, which greatly mitigates the well-known problem of indeterminate predictions in multicandidate competition. Applying the equilibrium concept to the model, I find that PR promotes representation of small parties in general, even when voters are strategic. However, the median voter plays a critical role in shaping policy outcomes, which reflects the majoritarian nature of parliamentary policy making rules. Thus, PR may not be incompatible with the majoritarian vision of representative democracy if voters’ main concern is policy outcomes.

scholarly journals Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Equilibrium Concept

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876–1917

1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey E. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Road ◽  
Telephone Companies ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Multiple Interest

Between 1876 and 1917, government philosophy toward telephone regulation began moving away from laissez-faire and toward some kind of involvement in economic affairs. However, while some early studies of regulation suggest business hostility to that policy, AT&T actively sought regulation, jogging government and the public in that direction. But this study is not just a restatement of the interest-group-capture theory, as offered by such economists as Stigler or historians as Kolko. Regulation resulted from the convergence of interests of many affected players, including residential and business telephone subscribers, the independent telephone companies that competed with AT&T, and the state and federal governments, as well as AT&T. I employ a multiple interest theory to account for telephone regulation, but unlike other studies using such a framework, I suggest that government is an independent actor with impact on the final policy outcome, and not merely an arena where private interests battle for control over policy outcomes, as is so common among other multiple interest studies of regulation.

Crowded Space, Fertile Ground: Party Entry and the Effective Number of Parties

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-342 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Kselman ◽  
Eleanor Neff Powell ◽  
Joshua A. Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Fertile Ground ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties

This paper develops a novel argument as to the conditions under which new political parties will form in democratic states. Our approach hinges on the manner in which politicians evaluate the policy implications of new party entry alongside considerations of incumbency for its own sake. We demonstrate that if candidates care sufficiently about policy outcomes, then the likelihood of party entry shouldincreasewith the effective number of status quo parties in the party system. This relationship weakens, and eventually disappears, as politicians’ emphasis on “office-seeking” motivations increases relative to their interest in public policy. We test these predictions with both aggregate electoral data in contemporary Europe and a data set on legislative volatility in Turkey, uncovering support for the argument that party system fragmentation should positively affect the likelihood of entry when policy-seeking motivations are relevant, but not otherwise.

scholarly journals The impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in Algeria. Applied to the elections of the National People’s Assembly (1997–2017)

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.

scholarly journals The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems

2011 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco De Sinopoli ◽  
Leo Ferraris ◽  
Giovanna Iannantuoni
Keyword(s):  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Representation Systems

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

scholarly journals Compliance with Covid-19 measures: evidence from New Zealand

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff Kaine ◽  
Suzie Greenhalgh ◽  
Vic Wright
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
Policy Measure ◽  
Social Distancing ◽  
Behavioural Responses ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
The World ◽  
Policy Measures

Governments around the world are seeking to slow the spread of Covid-19 by implementing measures that encourage, or mandate, changes in people's behaviour. These changes include the wearing of face masks, social distancing, and testing and self-isolating when unwell. The success of these measures depends on the commitment of individuals to change their behaviour accordingly. Understanding and predicting the motivation of individuals to change their behaviour is therefore critical in assessing the likely effectiveness of these measures in slowing the spread of the virus. In this paper we draw on a novel framework, the I3 Compliance Response Framework, to understand and predict the motivation of residents in Auckland, New Zealand, to comply with measures to prevent the spread of Covid-19. The Framework is based on two concepts. The first uses the involvement construct to predict the motivation of individuals to comply. The second separates the influence of the policy measure from the influence of the policy outcome on the motivation of individuals to comply. The Framework differentiates between the strength of individuals' motivation and their beliefs about the advantages and disadvantages of policy outcomes and policy measures. We show this differentiation is useful in predicting an individual's possible behavioural responses to a measure and how it assists government agencies to develop strategies to enhance compliance.

Evaluation of Optimum Parameters for Casting of Birla Lance Pipes

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-23
Author(s):  
Dinesh S. Shinde ◽  
Ashnut Dutt ◽  
Ranjan Kumar Ghadai ◽  
Kanak Kalita ◽  
Amer Nasr A. Elghaffar
Keyword(s):  
Critical Role ◽  
Flow Time ◽  
Process Parameter ◽  
Main Concern ◽  
Casting Defect ◽  
Pouring Temperature ◽  
Taguchi Analysis ◽  
Optimum Parameters ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Spinning Speed

Defects associated with casting of pipes are often a main concern for the industry. In this chapter, a Taguchi analysis is carried out to understand the effect of three process parameter pouring temperature (°C), die spinning speed (rpm), and coolant flow time (mins) on the casting defect of pipes. The defect is defined in this work as the difference between the desired thickness of the pipe and the minimum actual (experimentally) achieved. A L9 orthogonal array is designed to carry out the experiments. Based on the S/N ratio analysis and ANOVA, it is seen that the die spinning speed plays the most critical role in defect of the pipes. As per the conducted experiments and Taguchi analysis, pouring temperature is seen to have the lest influence on the defects.

Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 693-703 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Greenberg ◽  
Shlomo Weber
Keyword(s):  
Median Voter ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Potential Candidate ◽  
Stability Properties ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

The purpose of this article is to define and to prove formally the existence of an equilibrium under proportional representation, as well as partially to characterize it. Specifically, let m be the quota that represents the minimal number of voters necessary for a candidate to be elected. We show that there is a set of elected candidates, each choosing an alternative and each receiving at least m votes, such that no other potential candidate, by offering an additional alternative, can secure at least m votes for himself. We then investigate the structure, at equilibrium, of the set of individuals who support a given candidate, as well as study stability properties of the equilibrium. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to consist of a single candidate, thus generalizing Black's median-voter result.

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