SBRAC: Blockchain-based sealed-bid auction with bidding price privacy and public verifiability

2022 ◽  
Vol 65 ◽  
pp. 103082
Author(s):  
Biwen Chen ◽  
Xue Li ◽  
Tao Xiang ◽  
Peng Wang
Author(s):  
Kun Peng

In the Internet era electronic commerce is an important and popular industry. Electronic auctions provide a key function in e-commerce, enabling effective and fair distribution of electronic as well as non-electronic goods. Like other fields of e-commerce, e-auctions face serious security threats. Fraud can be committed by bidders or auctioneers. Most popular Internet auctions sites use an open-cry bidding process. This can add excitement to an auction in progress and possibly encourage new bidders to join an auction. However, there are serious difficulties in maintaining the security requirements often required in commercial auctions, particularly in terms of protecting bid confidentiality and bidder privacy. Additionally, some of the current auction techniques are interactive and require many rounds of communication before completion so that more time is required to determine the final winning price. Intensive communication over the insecure Internet is also a problem from the perspective of availability of service and network security. For these reasons most recent research in this area has concentrated on sealed-bid auctions. Sealed-bid auctions are the focus of this chapter. In this chapter, security requirements in e-auction including correctness, fairness, non-repudiation, robustness, public verifiability, bid privacy, and other desired properties like price flexibility and rule flexibility are introduced. The existing approaches to realize them are investigated. The authors show that the key requirement is bid privacy and the main challenge to the design of an e-auction is how to protect bid privacy without compromising other requirements and properties. Techniques to achieve bid privacy are presented in this chapter according to different application environments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Po-Chu Hsu ◽  
Atsuko Miyaji

In an M + 1 st-price auction, all bidders submit their bids simultaneously, and the M highest bidders purchase M identical goods at the M + 1 st bidding price. Previous research is constructed based on trusted managers such as a trusted third party (TTP), trusted mix servers, and honest managers. All of the previous auctions are not fit for edge-assisted IoT since they need TTP. In this paper, we formalize a notion of commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption and achieve no-TTP M + 1 -st auction based on blockchain with public verifiability. Our M + 1 st auction guarantees financial fairness, robustness, and correctness without TTP and is secure under a malicious model for the first time. Our M + 1 st auction can be executed over a distributed network and is thus fit for edge-assisted IoT. Furthermore, our formalized commutative bi-homomorphic multiparty encryption can be used in various applications for edge-assisted IoT, which needs to protect privacy and correctness.


Optik ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 167039
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose

Urban Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 004209802199178
Author(s):  
Nan Liu

In housing markets there is a trade-off between selling time and selling price, with pricing strategy being the balancing act between the two. Motivated by the Home Report scheme in Scotland, this paper investigates the role of information symmetry played in such a trade-off. Empirically, this study tests if sellers’ pricing strategy changes when more information becomes available and whether this, in turn, affects the trade-off between the selling price and selling time. Using housing transaction data of North-East Scotland between 1998Q2 and 2018Q2, the findings show that asking price has converged to the predicted price of the property since the introduction of the Home Report. While information transparency reduces the effect of ‘overpricing’ on selling time, there is little evidence to show that it reduces the impact of pricing strategy on the final selling price in the sealed-bid context.


Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 602
Author(s):  
Monisha Devi ◽  
Nityananda Sarma ◽  
Sanjib K. Deka

Cognitive radio (CR) has evolved as a novel technology for overcoming the spectrum-scarcity problem in wireless communication networks. With its opportunistic behaviour for improving the spectrum-usage efficiency, CR enables the desired secondary users (SUs) to dynamically utilize the idle spectrum owned by primary users. On sensing the spectrum to identify the idle frequency bands, proper spectrum-allocation mechanisms need to be designed to provide an effectual use of the radio resource. In this paper, we propose a single-sided sealed-bid sequential-bidding-based auction framework that extends the channel-reuse property in a spectrum-allocation mechanism to efficiently redistribute the unused channels. Existing auction designs primarily aim at maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue, due to which certain CR constraints remain excluded in their models. We address two such constraints, viz. the dynamics in spectrum opportunities and varying availability time of vacant channels, and formulate an allocation problem that maximizes the utilization of the radio spectrum. The auctioneer strategises winner determination based on bids collected from SUs and sequentially leases the unused channels, while restricting the channel assignment to a single-channel-multi-user allocation. To model the spectrum-sharing mechanism, we initially developed a group-formation algorithm that enables the members of a group to access a common channel. Furthermore, the spectrum-allocation and pricing algorithms are operated under constrained circumstances, which guarantees truthfulness in the model. An analysis of the simulation results and comparison with existing auction models revealed the effectiveness of the proposed approach in assigning the unexploited spectrum.


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