Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games

2019 ◽  
Vol 85 ◽  
pp. 46-51
Author(s):  
Haifeng Fu ◽  
Bin Wu
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilherme Carmona ◽  
Konrad Podczeck

Abstract We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. This characterization precisely describes the relationship between the equilibrium sets of the two classes of games. In particular, it yields several approximation results for Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, which roughly state that all finite-player games that are sufficiently close to a given game with a continuum of players have approximate equilibria that are close to a given Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic game.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronen Gradwohl ◽  
Ehud Kalai

This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.


2012 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 418-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilherme Carmona ◽  
Konrad Podczeck
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 35-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ran Spiegler

I present a simple framework for modeling two-firm market competition when consumer choice is “frame-dependent,” and firms use costless “marketing messages” to influence the consumer’s frame. This framework embeds several recent models in the “behavioral industrial organization” literature. I identify a property that consumer choice may satisfy, which extends the concept of Weighted Regularity due to Piccione and Spiegler (2012), and provide a characterization of Nash equilibria under this property. I use this result to analyze the equilibrium interplay between competition and framing in a variety of applications. (JEL D43, D82, M31)


2004 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guilherme Carmona
Keyword(s):  

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