Strategic behavior under tradeable driving permits and congestion tolls: A political economy model

2022 ◽  
Vol 128 ◽  
pp. 103396
Author(s):  
Bruno De Borger ◽  
Amihai Glazer ◽  
Stef Proost
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Congestion Tolls

A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers, Second Version

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Diermeier ◽  
Michael P. Keane ◽  
Antonio M. Merlo
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economy Model

Forecasting the 2002 Elections: Lessons from a Political Economy Model

2004 ◽  
pp. 178-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Jérôme ◽  
Veronique Jérôme-Speziari
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Economy Model

WHY THE STATE-BY-STATE POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL DID IT RIGHT

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (01) ◽  
pp. 45-46
Author(s):  
Bruno Jerôme ◽  
Véronique Jerôme-Speziari
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Barack Obama ◽  
The State ◽  
Popular Vote ◽  
Final State ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Error Margin ◽  
Us Presidential Election

One hundred and forty two days before the 2012 US presidential election our final State-by-State Political-Economy Model gave an advantage to Barack Obama with 51.6% of the popular vote (error margin ± 4.47) and 324 electoral votes (Jerôme and Jerôme-Speziari 2012). On November 6, 2012, with 51.6% of the vote and 332 electoral votes, the Democratic incumbent wins a second term. Regarding certainty of an Obama plurality, the model gave a probability of victory by 64%. In 2012, it seems that this was enough to ensure a good predictability.

Anti-trade Bias in Trade Policy and General Equilibrium

2004 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuno Limao ◽  
Arvind Panagariya
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
General Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Elasticity Of Substitution ◽  
Partial Equilibrium ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Economy Model ◽  
Partial Equilibrium Model ◽  
Ambiguous Effect ◽  
Trade Interventions

Abstract An important question that has continued to elude trade economists is why trade interventions are biased in favor of import-competing rather than exportable sectors. Indeed, as Philip Levy (1999) points out, under a set of neutrality assumptions, the dominant political-economy model, Grossman and Helpman (1994), predicts a pro-trade bias. We demonstrate that if we replace the almost partial equilibrium model with a general equilibrium model in the Grossman-Helpman political economy model, anti-trade bias may emerge even if we assume symmetric technologies, endowments and preferences across sectors provided that the elasticity of substitution in production exceeds unity. In addition, we show that ceteris paribus, in general equilibrium, increases in the imports-to-GDP ratio lower the endogenously chosen tariff and the production share of the import sector in GDP has an ambiguous effect.

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