Switching defence for switched systems under malicious attacks: A Stackelberg game approach

2021 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 101092
Author(s):  
Yabing Huang ◽  
Jun Zhao
2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 767-780 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibtissem Ernez-Gahbiche ◽  
Khaled Hadjyoussef ◽  
Abdelwaheb Dogui ◽  
Zied Jemai
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 39 (9) ◽  
pp. 1564-1569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu-Hui BU ◽  
Fa-Shan YU ◽  
Zhong-Sheng HOU ◽  
Fu-Zhong WANG

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 325-333
Author(s):  
Xu Liu ◽  
Xiaoqiang Di ◽  
Jinqing Li ◽  
Huamin Yang ◽  
Ligang Cong ◽  
...  

Background: User behavior models have been widely used to simulate attack behaviors in the security domain. We revised all patents related to response to attack behavior models. How to decide the protected target against multiple models of attack behaviors is studied. Methods: We utilize one perfect rational and three bounded rational behavior models to simulate attack behaviors in cloud computing, and then investigate cloud provider’s response based on Stackelberg game. The cloud provider plays the role of defender and it is assumed to be intelligent enough to predict the attack behavior model. Based on the prediction accuracy, two schemes are built in two situations. Results: If the defender can predict the attack behavior model accurately, a single-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy; otherwise, a multi-objective game model is built to find the optimal protection strategy. Conclusion: The numerical results prove that the game theoretic model performs better in the corresponding situation.


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