Formal description of HOrBAC model

Companies' information systems are regularly exposed to internal attacks perpetrated by users who have been granted access to the system. Discretionary, mandatory, role-based and organization-based access control models do not guarantee optimal protection against these attacks because these models trust in users. Therefore, they are unable to protect the system against attacks carried out by authenticated users, especially the super user who can carry out any type of internal attack on information system's data. The objective of this paper is to propose a model that excludes any trust in users. To do so, our model extends the OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) model by integrating two concepts: the organizational hierarchy and the redundant authentication. The model thus implemented offers a hierarchical and redundant access control to data and processing in an information system based on zero trust in users.

Formal description of HOrBAC model

Companies' information systems are regularly exposed to internal attacks perpetrated by users who have been granted access to the system. Discretionary, mandatory, role-based and organization-based access control models do not guarantee optimal protection against these attacks because these models trust in users. Therefore, they are unable to protect the system against attacks carried out by authenticated users, especially the super user who can carry out any type of internal attack on information system's data. The objective of this paper is to propose a model that excludes any trust in users. To do so, our model extends the OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) model by integrating two concepts: the organizational hierarchy and the redundant authentication. The model thus implemented offers a hierarchical and redundant access control to data and processing in an information system based on zero trust in users.

Formal description of HOrBAC model

Companies' information systems are regularly exposed to internal attacks perpetrated by users who have been granted access to the system. Discretionary, mandatory, role-based and organization-based access control models do not guarantee optimal protection against these attacks because these models trust in users. Therefore, they are unable to protect the system against attacks carried out by authenticated users, especially the super user who can carry out any type of internal attack on information system's data. The objective of this paper is to propose a model that excludes any trust in users. To do so, our model extends the OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) model by integrating two concepts: the organizational hierarchy and the redundant authentication. The model thus implemented offers a hierarchical and redundant access control to data and processing in an information system based on zero trust in users.

Formal description of HOrBAC model

Companies' information systems are regularly exposed to internal attacks perpetrated by users who have been granted access to the system. Discretionary, mandatory, role-based and organization-based access control models do not guarantee optimal protection against these attacks because these models trust in users. Therefore, they are unable to protect the system against attacks carried out by authenticated users, especially the super user who can carry out any type of internal attack on information system's data. The objective of this paper is to propose a model that excludes any trust in users. To do so, our model extends the OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) model by integrating two concepts: the organizational hierarchy and the redundant authentication. The model thus implemented offers a hierarchical and redundant access control to data and processing in an information system based on zero trust in users.

Formal description of HOrBAC model

Companies' information systems are regularly exposed to internal attacks perpetrated by users who have been granted access to the system. Discretionary, mandatory, role-based and organization-based access control models do not guarantee optimal protection against these attacks because these models trust in users. Therefore, they are unable to protect the system against attacks carried out by authenticated users, especially the super user who can carry out any type of internal attack on information system's data. The objective of this paper is to propose a model that excludes any trust in users. To do so, our model extends the OrBAC (Organization Based Access Control) model by integrating two concepts: the organizational hierarchy and the redundant authentication. The model thus implemented offers a hierarchical and redundant access control to data and processing in an information system based on zero trust in users.

mRNA COVID-19 vaccine: A future hope for cancer treatment

Background: mRNA vaccines have a strong potential for a possible cancer therapy platform. They express tumor antigens in antigen-presenting cells (APCs) after immunization, facilitating innate/adaptive immune stimulation. Because of its high effectiveness, safe administration, rapid development potential, and cost-efficient manufacturing, the mRNA cancer vaccine surpasses other traditional vaccination platforms. Conclusion: Careful evaluation of promising mRNA vaccines to supervise as carriers of lipids for cancer patients needs to be done. In addition, a possible revaluation for optimal protection is required. However, the extent to which solid tumours might take a significant part of the vaccine doses is still unknown.

mRNA COVID-19 vaccines induce enhanced antibody and cellular responses compared to ChAdOx1 or natural infection in children

We present a comprehensive analysis of antibody and cellular responses in children aged 12-16 years who received COVID-19 vaccination with ChAdOx1 (n=6) or mRNA vaccine (mRNA-1273 or BNT162b2, n=9) using a 12-week extended-interval schedule. mRNA vaccination of seropositive children induces high antibody levels, with one dose, but a second dose is required in infection-naïve children. Following a second ChAdOx1 dose, antibody titres were higher than natural infection, but lower than mRNA vaccination. Vaccination induced live virus neutralising antibodies against Alpha, Beta and Delta variants, however, a second dose is required in infection-naïve children. We found higher T-cell responses following mRNA vaccination than ChAdOx1. Phenotyping of responses showed predominantly early effector-memory CD4 T cell populations, with a type-1 cytotoxic cytokine signature, with IL-10. These data demonstrate mRNA vaccination induces a co-ordinated superior antibody and robust cellular responses in children. Seronegative children require a prime-boost regime for optimal protection.

Vaccination Schedules

First vaccines and vaccination schedules were based on “trial and error” and on immunogenicity data (serology). Latest since the 1990s, vaccination schedules are based on well-defined phase 1–3 development programs as basis for licensure of any new product. Vaccination schedules must bear in mind the epidemiology of the targeted disease; the biology of available vaccine product(s); local opportunities to vaccinate; monitoring for the desired outcome. There are 4 basic primary vaccination schedules for children, based on historical development and local needs. Birth doses are recommended with BCG and hepatitis B vaccine. Dosing in the 2nd year of life is usually needed for long term-protection induced by polysaccharide-conjugate vaccines. Live vaccines (MMR, VZV) are usually given as of 9 months of age – later dosing may induce improved immune responses; a second dose is needed before school entry for optimal protection. In addition to “general regular schedules” vaccines and schedules emerge for pregnant women, international travelers, persons above 60 or 65 years, immunocompromised hosts.