scholarly journals A robust von Neumann minimax theorem for zero-sum games under bounded payoff uncertainty

2011 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Jeyakumar ◽  
G.Y. Li ◽  
G.M. Lee
2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
pp. 115-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
HICHEM BEN-EL-MECHAIEKH ◽  
ROBERT W. DIMAND

Von Neumann proved the minimax theorem (existence of a saddle-point solution to 2 person, zero sum games) in 1928. While his second article on the minimax theorem, stating the proof, has long been translated from German, his first announcement of his result (communicated in French to the Academy of Sciences in Paris by Borel, who had posed the problem settled by Von Neumann's proof) is translated here for the first time. The proof presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) is not Von Neumann's rather involved proof of 1928, but is based on what they called "The Theorem of the Alternative for Matrices" which is in essence a reformulation of an elegant and elementary result by Borel's student Jean Ville in 1938. Ville's argument was the first to bring to light the simplifying role of convexity and to highlight the connection between the existence of minimax and the solvability of systems of linear inequalities. It by-passes nontrivial topological fixed point arguments and allows the treatment of minimax by simpler geometric methods. This approach has inspired a number of seminal contributions in convex analysis including fixed point and coincidence theory for set-valued mappings. Ville's contributions are discussed briefly and von Neuman's original communication, Ville's note, and Borel's commentary on it are translated here for the first time.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-631
Author(s):  
Juan Carvajalino

In his famous “A Model of General Economic Equilibrium,” von Neumann wrote that it was “obvious to what kind of theoretical models [his] assumptions correspond.” To date, however, his sources of economic insights about the functioning of the continuously growing price-economy that he modeled have remained a total mystery. Based on archival material, this mystery is solved in this account by making visible the specific influences from economics and mathematics that inspired him. I argue that von Neumann’s 1937 paper resulted from a deep engagement with economics as it was emerging at the beginning of the 1930s and that this happened as he was travelling and crossing national boundaries while bridging distinct branches of mathematics with different local perspectives in economics. His encounters with Jacob Marschak in Berlin, Nicolas Kaldor in Budapest, and Frank Graham in Princeton as well as his reading of Walras’s, Wicksell’s and Cassel’s work would be key. I also explain how he came to realize that there existed a formal analogy between systems of linear equations and inequalities with which he characterized (stationary and dynamic) economies and the minimax theorem for two-person zero-sum games that he had conceived and proved in 1928.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1185-1201
Author(s):  
Florian Brandl ◽  
Felix Brandt

Developing normative foundations for optimal play in two‐player zero‐sum games has turned out to be surprisingly difficult, despite the powerful strategic implications of the minimax theorem. We characterize maximin strategies by postulating coherent behavior in varying games. The first axiom, called consequentialism, states that how probability is distributed among completely indistinguishable actions is irrelevant. The second axiom, consistency, demands that strategies that are optimal in two different games should still be optimal when there is uncertainty regarding which of the two games will actually be played. Finally, we impose a very mild rationality assumption, which merely requires that strictly dominated actions will not be played. Our characterization shows that a rational and consistent consequentialist who ascribes the same properties to his opponent has to play maximin strategies. This result can be extended to characterize Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games whenever the set of equilibria is interchangeable.


2004 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferenc Forgó

The paper gives a brief account of von Neumann's contribution to the foundation of game theory: definition of abstract games, the minimax theorem for two-person zero-sum games and the stable set solution for cooperative games with side payments. The presentation is self-contained, uses very little mathematical formalism and caters to the nonspecialist. Basic concepts and their implications are in focus. It is also indicated how von Neumann's groundbreaking work initiated further research, and a few unsolved problems are also mentioned.


Author(s):  
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta

The movie A Beautiful Mind (2001) portrays the life and work of John F. Nash Jr., who received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1994. A class of his theories deals with how people should behave in strategic situations that involve what are known as “mixed strategies,” that is, choosing among various possible strategies when no single one is always the best when you face a rational opponent. This chapter uses data from a specific play in soccer (a penalty kick) with professional players to provide the first complete test of a fundamental theorem in game theory: the minimax theorem. The minimax theorem can be regarded as a special case of the more general theory of Nash. It applies only to two-person, zero-sum or constant-sum games, whereas the Nash equilibrium concept can be used with any number of players and any mixture of conflict and common interest in the game.


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