Sustainable cooperation in multicriteria multistage games

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 557-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Kuzyutin ◽  
Ekaterina Gromova ◽  
Yaroslavna Pankratova
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 70-75
Author(s):  
B.E. Yagaliyeva ◽  
◽  
B.B. Akhmetov ◽  
V.A. Lakhno ◽  
G.S. Zhilkishbayeva ◽  
...  

A model for managing the investment process is proposed, based on the example of investing in cybersecurity of national scale informatization objects, taking into account the multifactorial nature of this process. The difference between this model and those previously developed is that, firstly, it considers the investment process as a complex structure, for which it is not enough to model it as a one-factor category. Second, our model is based on the solution of a bilinear multi-step quality game with several terminal surfaces. The solution is obtained within the framework of the scheme of a new class of bilinear multistage games describing the interaction of objects in a multidimensional space. Consideration of the investment process in such a setting makes it possible to adequately describe the process of searching for rational strategies of players in the course of investing in information technologies. The study made it possible to implement the program code of the model in the MatLab simulation environment.


2018 ◽  
pp. 157-213
Author(s):  
Jacek B. Krawczyk ◽  
Vladimir Petkov
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 111-184
Author(s):  
Vladislav I. Zhukovskiy ◽  
Mindia E. Salukvadze
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jacek B. Krawczyk ◽  
Vladimir Petkov
Keyword(s):  

1968 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
T Matsumoto ◽  
E Shimemura
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 67-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
PIERPAOLO BATTIGALLI

Focusing on signaling games, I illustrate the relevance of the rationalizability approach for the analysis multistage games with incomplete information. I define a class of iterative solution procedures, featuring a notion of "forward induction": the Receiver tries to explain the Sender's message in a way which is consistent with the Sender's strategic sophistication and certain given restrictions on beliefs. The approach is applied to some numerical examples and economic models. In a standard model with verifiable messages a full disclosure result is obtained. In a model of job market signaling the best separating equilibrium emerges as the unique rationalizable outcome only when the high and low types are sufficiently different. Otherwise, rationalizability only puts bounds on the education choices of different types.


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