Justified Communication Equilibrium

Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51)

Signaling games and music as a credible signal

The argument by Mehr et al. that music emerged and evolved culturally as a credible signal is convincing, but it lacks one essential ingredient: a model of signaling behavior that supports the main hypothesis theoretically and empirically. We argue that signaling games can help us explain how musical structures emerge as population-level phenomena, through sender–receiver signaling interactions.

How Signaling Games Explain Mimicry at Many Levels: From Viral Epidemiology to Human Sociology

Mimicry is exhibited in multiple scales, ranging from molecular, to organismal, and then to human society. ‘Batesian’ type mimicry entails a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, reflected in a deceptive mimic signal. ‘Mullerian’ type mimicry occurs when there is perfect common interest between sender and receiver, manifested by an honest co-mimic signal. Using a signaling games approach, simulations show that invasion by Batesian mimics will make Mullerian mimicry unstable, in a coevolutionary chase. We use these results to better understand the deceptive strategies of SARS-CoV-2 and their key role in the COVID-19 pandemic. At the biomolecular level, we explain how cellularization promotes Mullerian molecular mimicry, and discourages Batesian molecular mimicry. A wide range of processes analogous to cellularization are presented; these might represent a manner of reducing oscillatory instabilities. Lastly, we identify examples of mimicry in human society, that might be addressed using a signaling game approach.