Firm-level innovation by Japanese family firms: Empirical analysis using multidimensional innovation measures

This article theoretically and empirically intertwines agency and stewardship theories to examine their distinct and combined influences on family firms. Primary matched triadic data from CEOs, family employees, and nonfamily employees in 77 family firms suggest that agency and stewardship governance affects individual-level behavior and firm-level performance. Specifically, agent behavior is highest under conditions of coexisting low agency governance and high stewardship governance and is lowest when agency and stewardship governance coexist at high levels. Furthermore, when high levels of agency and stewardship governance coexist, family firm performance is the highest. Theoretical implications and future research directions are discussed.

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Compliance management in family firms: A systematic literature analysis

Corporate Ownership and Control ◽

10.22495/cocv17i1art13 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 140-157

Author(s):

Behringer Stefan ◽

Ulrich Patrick ◽

Unruh Anjuli

Keyword(s):

Family Firms ◽

Dissemination And Implementation ◽

Entrepreneurial Firms ◽

Firm Level ◽

Family Control ◽

Compliance Management ◽

Individual Level ◽

Economic Role ◽

Family Enterprises ◽

Corporate Governance Codes

Family firms play an important economic role in Europe and in the world. The discussion of compliance-relevant issues has long been attributed to capital market-oriented large companies. So far, there have been few findings on the perception, dissemination and implementation of this concept in family businesses. The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic and iterative literature review of available research on compliance management and corruption in family firms. Thereby a total of 47 articles on the topic were identified. The review acknowledged that Compliance/Corruption is a research topic but not often in the context of family firms. The literature of family enterprises dealt with the influence of family ownership on firms’ non-compliance with corporate governance codes out of the socio-emotional wealth perspective or examined the relationship between family control and young entrepreneurial firms’ bribing behaviour around the globe. Another perspective offers the literature about the agency and stewardship theories and their influence on family firms. Agency and stewardship governance affects individual-level behaviour and firm-level performance in a distinct and combined way. In the business ethics literature a few interesting papers were found, that consider unethical work behaviour or corrupt acts in the context of organizations and family firms. In addition, the analysis of the publications demonstrates the importance of compliance management in all types of companies/SMEs and shows that companies which have integrated compliance management gain a competitive advantage over their competitors. We come to the conclusion that additional empirical research on compliance and corruption in family firms is needed.

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