Dynamic social networks facilitate cooperation in the N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma

2012 ◽  
Vol 391 (23) ◽  
pp. 6199-6211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Golriz Rezaei ◽  
Michael Kirley
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dynamic Social Networks

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on Newman–Watts social networks with an asymmetric payoff distribution mechanism

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 010204-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Du Wen-Bo ◽  
Cao Xian-Bin ◽  
Yang Han-Xin ◽  
Hu Mao-Bin
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Payoff Distribution

scholarly journals Prisoner's Dilemma on real social networks: Revisited

2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (5/6) ◽  
pp. 1381-1398 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Cintrón-Arias ◽  
Sharon M. Cameron
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Effective seeding strategy in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on online social networks

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (09) ◽  
pp. 1550027 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Xu ◽  
Huibin Shi ◽  
Jianwei Wang ◽  
Yun Huang
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Online Social Networks ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Online Social Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Minimum Cost ◽  
Network Size ◽  
Degree Centrality ◽  
Seeding Strategy

This paper explores effective seeding strategies in prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on online social networks, i.e. the optimal strategy to obtain global cooperation with minimum cost. Three distinct seeding strategies are compared by performing computer simulations on real online social network datasets. Our finding suggests that degree centrality seeding outperforms other strategies regardless of the initial payoff setting or network size. Celebrities of online social networks play key roles in preserving cooperation.

On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory

2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Axelrod
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Learning Behavior ◽  
Interaction Information ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

AbstractThe symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to take into account such factors as nonsimultaneous play, the ability to offer hostages for performance, social networks of interaction, information sharing that can support reputations, learning behavior, envy, misunderstanding, and an option to exit. The essay places the contributions of this symposium in the context of previous research on these and related issues.

Zu brav oder zu böse? Mobbing-Opfer und Abgelehnte im Prisoner's Dilemma-Paradigma

1999 ◽  
Vol 30 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 179-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beate Schuster
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma

Zusammenfassung: Der soziometrische Status und der Viktimisierungsstatus von 5. bis 11. Klässlern wurde ermittelt, der Status hypothetischer InteraktionspartnerInnen sowie deren angebliche Wahlen variiert, und die Reaktionen im Gefangenendilemma erfaßt. Die Reaktionen wurden sowohl durch die experimentell vorgegebenen als auch durch die erwarteten Wahlen der InteraktionspartnerInnen bestimmt: Kooperative Zuege wurden eher kooperativ, und kompetitive Zuege eher kompetitiv beantwortet. Darüber hinaus vermieden Mobbingopfer kompetitive Züge, während zwei Untergruppen der Abgelehnten gegensätzliche Strategiepräferenzen aufwiesen: Versuchspersonen, die sowohl Ablehnung als auch Mobbing erfahren («Viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») verhielten sich besonders kooperativ; abgelehnte ProbandInnen, die nicht viktimisiert werden («Nicht-viktimisiert-Abgelehnte») dagegen vergleichsweise kompetitiv. Die kooperativen Wahlen viktimisierter Versuchspersonen wurden nicht erwidert: Die Versuchspersonen reagierten gegenüber den Viktimisierten kompetitiver als sich die Viktimisierten ihrerseits gegenüber ihren InteraktionspartnerInnen verhielten. Diese Befunde bestätigen die Notwendigkeit, bei «Abgelehnten» zwei Untergruppen auf der Basis der Viktimisierungsdimension zu unterscheiden. Die Befunde werden ferner vor dem Hintergrund der Hypothese diskutiert, daß die Submissivität potentieller Opfer mit zu ihrer Viktimisierungs-Erfahrung beiträgt.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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