Game-theoretical approach to payoff distribution in joint construction of transportation and engineering networks

The article discusses a game-theoretical approach to payoff distribution between the construction participants during the transport and engineering networks construction. The construction participants can be both the owners of land plots or buildings, and the administrative personnel of settlements and states. It is shown that payoff distribution between the participants should satisfy two principles: dominance and fairness. To determine fair payoff, the mathematical apparatus of cooperative games is used and the Shapley vector is calculated. Options for the implementation of a construction project for 4 and 8 participants are being considered. The use of the Lutsenko formula, which greatly simplifies the calculation of the Shapley vector components for the considered problem of transport and engineering networks construction, is discussed.

Identifying Present Bias from the Timing of Choices

A (partially naïve) quasi-hyperbolic discounter repeatedly chooses whether to complete a task. Her net benefits of task completion are drawn independently between periods from a time-invariant distribution. We show that the probability of completing the task conditional on not having done so earlier increases towards the deadline. Conversely, we establish nonidentifiability by proving that for any time-preference parameters and any dataset with such (weakly increasing) task-completion probabilities, there exists a stationary payoff distribution that rationalizes the agent’s behavior if she is either sophisticated or fully naïve. Additionally, we provide sharp partial identification for the case of observable continuation values. (JEL C14, D11, D15, D90, D91)

Implementation of Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreement in an Extensive-Form Game

A novel approach to sustainable cooperation called subgameperfect core (S-P Core) was introduced by P. Chander and M. Wooders in 2020 for n-person extensive-form games with terminal payoffs. This solution concept incorporates both subgame perfection and cooperation incentives and implies certain distribution of the total players' payoff at the terminal node of the cooperative history. We use in the paper an extension of the S-P Core to the class of extensive games with payoffs defined at all nodes of the game tree that is based on designing an appropriate payoff distribution procedure β and its implementation when a game unfolds along the cooperative history. The difference is that in accordance with this so-called β-subgameperfect core the players can redistribute total current payoff at each node in the cooperative path. Moreover, a payoff distribution procedure from the β-S-P Core satisfies a number of good properties such as subgame efficiency, non-negativity and strict balance condition. In the paper, we examine different properties of the β-S-P Core, introduce several refinements of this cooperative solution and provide examples of its implementation in extensive-form games. Finally, we consider an application of the β-S-P Core to the symmetric discrete-time alternating-move model of fishery management.

Efficient Coding and Risky Choice

We experimentally test a theory of risky choice in which the perception of a lottery payoff is noisy due to information processing constraints in the brain. We model perception using the principle of efficient coding, which implies that perception is most accurate for those payoffs that occur most frequently. Across two pre-registered laboratory experiments, we manipulate the distribution from which payoffs in the choice set are drawn. In our first experiment, we find that risk taking is more sensitive to payoffs that are presented more frequently. In a follow-up task, we incentivize subjects to classify which of two symbolic numbers is larger. Subjects exhibit higher accuracy and faster response times for numbers they have observed more frequently. In our second experiment, we manipulate the payoff distribution so that efficient coding induces the decision maker’s perceived value function to switch from concave to convex. We find that demand for risk is significantly higher when efficient coding induces a convex value function. Together, our experimental results suggest that risk taking depends systematically on the payoff distribution to which the decision maker’s perceptual system has recently adapted. More broadly, we provide novel evidence of the importance of imprecise and efficient coding in economic decision-making.

A TIME-CONSISTENT SOLUTION FORMULA FOR BARGAINING PROBLEM IN DIFFERENTIAL GAMES

This paper presents a solution formula for the payoff distribution procedure of a bargaining problem in cooperative differential game that would lead to a time consistent outcome. In particular, individual rationality is satisfied for every player throughout the cooperation period.