The grievance asymmetry revisited: A micro study of economic voting in Denmark,1986–1992

1997 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Nannestad ◽  
Martin Paldam
Keyword(s):  
Social Forces ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 1339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clem Brooks ◽  
David Brady

2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 541-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-François Godbout ◽  
Éric Bélanger

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindy D. Kam
Keyword(s):  

Social Forces ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 1339-1374
Author(s):  
C. Brooks ◽  
D. Brady

1998 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Guérin ◽  
Richard Nadeau

AbstractThis study deals with the question of economic voting in Canada, notably that the electoral impact of economic perceptions with regard to the performance of the federal government has not been homogeneous among the whole Canadian electorate during the period of Liberal dominance in Quebec. Contrary to our Findings on voters in other provinces, francophone Quebeckers did not vote according to their judgment of the government on economic matters, their fidelity to the Liberal party having inhibited them in this respect. These results suggest that the absence of economic voting in Quebec during the Liberal regime may clarify, at least in part, the puzzling conclusions of previous research, that show a fragile relationship between the economy and the electoral outcomes in Canada. These findings break new ground for a better understanding of the specific electoral rationality used by minorities in long-established democracies.


2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byong-Kuen Jhee

This study explores how economic performance prior to democratic transitions affects the fate of successors to authoritarian rulers in new democracies. It investigates 70 founding election outcomes, finding that successful economic performance under an authoritarian regime increases the vote share of successors. It also finds that the past economic performance of authoritarian rulers decreases the likelihood of government alternation to democratic oppositions. Interim governments that initiate democratic transition, however, are neither blamed nor rewarded for economic conditions during transition periods. This study concludes that electorates are not myopic and that economic voting is not a knee-jerk reaction to short-term economic performance in new democracies.


2016 ◽  
Vol 131 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan M. Ragusa ◽  
Matthew Tarpey

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