scholarly journals The Role of the Bretton Woods Institutions in Global Economic Governance

2015 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Maria Eleni Voutsa ◽  
George Borovas
Keyword(s):  
Economic Governance ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Bretton Woods Institutions ◽  
Global Economic Governance

Global Economic Governance in the Wake of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Is China Remaking Bretton Woods?

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 542-569
Author(s):  
Chien-Huei Wu
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
The United States ◽  
Infrastructure Investment ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Investment Bank ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank ◽  
Bretton Woods Institutions ◽  
Global Economic Governance

Abstract This article examines China’s participation in the trade, monetary and development assistance fields and concludes that China’s rise does not undermine the centrality of the Bretton Woods institutions or Word Trade Organization (WTO) in global economic governance. Whereas China’s participation in the WTO presents some challenges to the long dominance of the United States and the European Union, it reaffirms the central role of the WTO. China’s monetary strategy also indicates the continuing importance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the international monetary regime. Whereas the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) introduces some competition to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), China’s efforts in establishing new multilateral development banks are mainly driven by its frustration with stalled reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. By and large, China’s economic emergence does not challenge, but reaffirms, the post-World War II global economic architecture.

THE DECENTRALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARCHITECTURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM AND ROLE OF ASIA

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
PRADUMNA B. RANA ◽  
WAI-MUN CHIA ◽  
XIANBAI JI
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Regional Institutions ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
Belt And Road ◽  
Economic Partnership ◽  
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership ◽  
The Belt And Road ◽  
Global Economic Governance

Global economic governance is in flux. The centralized international trade architecture of the post-Bretton Woods era is decentralizing as new regional institutions are being established for various reasons. Decentralization per se is neither good nor bad. It depends on whether there is “healthy” competition and functional complementarity or “unhealthy” competition between global and new regional institutions. This paper has three objectives, to: (i) review the decentralization of the international trade architecture; (ii) identify the benefits and the risks of the decentralization process and its implications for the centrality of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and (iii) recommend policies for the WTO to manage the process. The paper argues that, so far, the benefits of new regional institutions and trade decentralization appear to have outweighed the risks, and as a result global economic governance may have improved. Looking ahead, the paper recommends a number of policy actions that the WTO should take to manage trade decentralization. The paper argues that Asian countries, especially those that are members of the G20, should play a greater role in lobbying and driving the needed reforms of the WTO. They should also seek to expedite the conclusion and ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and eventually institutionalize the complementarity between RCEP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

scholarly journals Political Opportunities and China’s Proposing Behavior in the G20

2019 ◽  
Vol 01 (01) ◽  
pp. 1850002
Author(s):  
Hongsong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Regulation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Policy Initiatives ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Political Consensus ◽  
Global Economic Governance

In global economic governance, political consensus reached by the G20 members plays an important role of defining governance ideas and governance directions as well as steering and boosting collective actions. Political opportunities are essential for the G20 members’ successful efforts to place their preferences into the political consensus of G20. This paper analyzes how the G20 members place their preferences into the political consensus of G20 through the lens of political opportunity, and provides a relatively detailed demonstration on China’s practice of proposing policy initiatives and placing its preferences into the political consensus of G20 by examining the cases of International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform and international financial regulation reform.

The International Labour Standards Regime: A Case Study in Global Regulation

2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (11) ◽  
pp. 1939-1953 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Haworth ◽  
Stephen Hughes ◽  
Rorden Wilkinson
Keyword(s):  
Executive Leadership ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
International Labour Organisation ◽  
Global Consensus ◽  
The Social ◽  
Labour Standards ◽  
International Labour Standards ◽  
Global Economic Governance

The World Trade Organisation's (WTO) consistent rejection of proposals for the inclusion of a social clause into its existing rules and regulations has prompted the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to examine alternative ways in which global consensus on the regulation of labour standards can be developed. In this paper we map the failure of the social clause debate by reference to the outcome of successive WTO ministerials and we examine the role of executive leadership and related epistemic activity in the development of the international labour standards regime (ILSR). We conclude that the switch to a focus on a regime of core labour standards provides the most promising platform for progress in labour protection and an influential outcome in placing the ILO at the heart of attempts to integrate social policy into global economic governance.

scholarly journals O banco e o arranjo de reserva dos BRICS em perspectiva

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-426
Author(s):  
Jackson Ribeiro ◽  
Gilberto Maringoni
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
World Bank ◽  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Development Bank ◽  
Bretton Woods ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
New Development ◽  
The World ◽  
Bretton Woods Institutions

Este artigo tem como objetivo analisar os documentos da cúpula dos BRICS de Fortaleza, ocorrida em julho de 2014 que criou duas instituições financeiras, o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento - NBD - e o Arranjo Contingencial de Reservas - ACR. São iniciativas importantes para estreitar os laços do grupo que reúne Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul, além de servirem para alargar a ordem monetária e financeira internacional. O NBD e o ACR são complementares às instituições multilaterais tradicionais de Bretton Woods: Banco Mundial e FMI. Complementares, pois foi adotada uma orientação cautelosa na criação desses arranjos protagonizados pelos BRICS. Tais arranjos alternativos incorporaram muitas prerrogativas e princípios do Banco Mundial e FMI, como a necessidade de acordo de cada país membro para acessar parte relevante de recursos no ACR. Mesmo incorporando prerrogativas e os princípios dominantes nessas organizações tradicionais NBD e ACR criam ambientes institucionais com potencial para possibilitar novos desdobramentos.     Abstract: This article aims to analyse the documents of the BRICS Fortaleza summit held in July 2014 that created two financial institutions, the New Development Bank – NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement – CRA. They are important initiatives to strengthen the ties of the group that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as well as serve to broaden the international monetary and financial order. NDB and CRA are complementary to traditional multilateral Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and the IMF. Complementary, because a cautious orientation was adopted in the creation of these BRICS arrangements. Such alternative arrangements have incorporated many prerogatives and principles of the World Bank and IMF, such as the need for each member country to agree to access a relevant part of the resources in the CRA. Even incorporating prerogatives and the dominant principles in these traditional NDB and CRA organisations create institutional environments with the potential to enable further unfoldings. Keywords: BRICS; NDB; ACR; ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE.     Recebido em: fevereiro/2019. Aprovado em: setembro/2019.

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