Efficient Causation and Neuroscientific Explanations of Criminal Action

Author(s):  
Nick J. Davis
Keyword(s):  
2020 ◽  
pp. 87-136
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt

Chapter 3 argues that Descartes’ views about mind–body interaction are internally consistent, and compatible with his more general views about causation; thus neither Descartes nor his followers were forced to reject interactionism to maintain mind–body dualism. In some later works, Descartes says that corporeal motions “give occasion” to the mind to form ideas, which are innate to the mind. Section 3.3 argues that these remarks are consistent with his claims in earlier texts that corporeal motions produce or bring about ideas in the mind. This causal theory of sensation seems to be inconsistent with general causal principles that Descartes endorses elsewhere—such as the principle that a cause must contain, “formally or eminently,” whatever it brings about in its effect. But sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that Descartes’ general statements about efficient causation are compatible with the view that bodily motions have the power to elicit sensations in the mind.


Author(s):  
Andrea Sangiacomo

Kant’s New Elucidation (1755) is an important source for understanding how early modern debates managed to import and adapt the notion of sine qua non causation in the domain of natural philosophy. In order to clarify Kant’s position, the chapter focuses on two preliminary historical moments: the marginalization of sine qua non causation in Suárez’s account of efficient causation and the forceful revival of sine qua non causation in Malebranche’s occasionalism. In the New Elucidation Kant adopts an understanding of causation similar to that of Malebranche, while also clarifying the way in which God’s involvement in nature has to be understood. In so doing, Kant takes issue with some of the ambiguities of Malebranche’s own account that were hotly debated by his contemporaries.


2005 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-131
Author(s):  
Lewis S. Ford ◽  
Keyword(s):  

1984 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-46
Author(s):  
Richard W. Field ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-114
Author(s):  
Amene Mir ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pauline Phemister

Drawing on a Leibnizian panpsychist ontology of living beings that have a body and a soul, this paper outlines a theory of space based on the perceptual and appetitive relations among these creatures’ souls. In parallel with physical space founded on relations among bodies subject to efficient causation, teleological space results from relations among souls subject to final causation and is described qualitatively in terms of creatures’ pleasure and pain, wellbeing and happiness. Particular places within this space include the kingdom of grace, where morally responsible, rational beings act as far as possible in accord with the ideal of justice as universal love and wise benevolence. However, while Leibniz considered love as properly directed only towards rational beings, it is argued here that the truly wise person will direct their love and benevolence towards all living things. Ausgehend von Leibniz’ panpsychistischer Ontologie von Lebewesen, die einen Körper und eine Seele haben, skizziert dieser Beitrag eine Theorie des Raumes, der auf den perzeptuellen und appetitiven Relationen zwischen den Seelen der Geschöpfe beruht. Parallel zum physikalischen Raum, der in Relationen zwischen den effizient kausal interagierenden Körper begründet liegt, ergibt sich aus den Relationen zwischen den Seelen, die finaler Verursachung unterliegen und in qualitativen Begriffen von Freude und Schmerz wie von Wohl und Zufriedenheit beschrieben werden, ein teleologischer Raum. Besondere Regionen dieses Raumes bilden das Königreich der Gnade, wo moralisch verantwortliche, rationale Wesen so weit wie möglich in Übereinstimmung mit dem Ideal der Gerechtigkeit als universale Liebe und weise Güte handeln. Während Leibniz jedoch meinte, dass sich echte Liebe nur auf rationale Wesen richte, wird hier argumentiert, dass eine wahrhaft weise Person ihre Liebe und Güte auf alle Lebewesen beziehen wird.


Author(s):  
Argyris Arnellos ◽  
Charbel El-Hani

This chapter explains emergence in biological organizations through a conception of ontological emergence according to which certain types of dynamical organizations possess irreducible properties that are nevertheless derivable from the substrate. The authors concentrate on the ontological dimension of emergence as the irreducibly causal configuration exhibited by all organizations that manifest persistence and stability in their environment. This is a conception of ontological emergence where the locus of novel causal powers is the configuration of constituents into stable dynamic organizations. There is nothing brute to be explained in the emergence of causal properties in a biological organization; all that is needed is the consideration of its organizational characteristics in terms of same-level and inter-level causal interactions, the type of which is of formal causation for interactions among the constituents of the organization and of efficient causation for interactions among the constituents and the micro-properties of their surrounding emergence base.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 194-208
Author(s):  
Derrick L. Hassert

Reductionism is usually taken for granted in many areas of science, neuroscience and psychology being no exceptions. It is often assumed as scientific orthodoxy that human behavior can be reduced to “what the brain does” without recourse to a consideration of cognition. Although many philosophers and ethicists may seek to reduce or eliminate the concept of mind, other philosophers and ethicists have continually pointed out the logical inconsistencies of such an approach. Via a discussion of efficient and final causes in Aristotelian philosophy, I seek to argue that the understanding of human beings as rational and social creatures has guided and should continue to guide our approach to the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Observations concerning rational behavior and cognition, by necessity, have provided the benchmarks by which clinicians evaluate the effectiveness of somatic/pharmacological or psychological/ behavioral interventions: Eliminative reductionism is inappropriate in this area. In approaching issues pertaining to the relationship between human cognitive functioning and neural functioning, the distinction between capacity and vehicle will be used. However, the fact that mental and behavioral functioning can alter neuronal functioning (and vice versa) necessitates that those working with the mentally ill need to know both the efficient causes—the vehicles of certain capacities—and the role of the capacities themselves and how they relate to possible final causes in giving explanations for behavior. These issues become more significant when considering the ethics of treatment choice for those with mental disorders.


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