Nature’s Perfection: Aristotle and Descartes on Motion and Purpose

Descartes holds that, insofar as nature is a purposeless, unthinking, extended substance, there could be no final causes in physics. Descartes’ derivation of his three laws of motion from the perfections of God thus underwrites a rejection of Aristotle’s conception of natural self-motion and teleology. Aristotle derived his conception of the purposeful action of sublunar creatures from his notion that superlunar bodies are perfect, eternal, living beings, via the thesis that circular motion is more complete or perfect than rectilinear motion. Descartes’ reduction of circular motion to rectilinear motion, achieved through his theological foundation of the laws of motion, thus marks a crucial break from Aristotle’s philosophy of nature. This paper argues that the shift from the Aristotelian conception of nature as self-moving and teleological to the Cartesian conception of nature as purposeless and inert, is not an empirical discovery but is rooted in differing conceptions of where perfection lies in nature.

The Gender Gap in Engineering Education During The COVID-19 Lockdown: A Study Case

Higher education in Spain, especially in Madrid, was suddenly and unex-pectedly shut down on March 9th 2020 because of the beginning of the COVID-19 first wave emergency. In engineering education, where practical laboratories are a relevant part of the educational process, professors followed different approaches (sometimes concurrently), designed after only three or five days of discussions. Although, globally, the obtained results are ac-ceptable considering the situation, after informally analyzing the data and observing the post-lockdown students’ profile, it emerges clearly that some collectives have suffered a higher impact than other. The objective of this work is to analyze if the performance of women in engineering courses, spe-cifically in computer engineering, is different from male students. The study case is carried out at Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, particularly, in the computer engineering degree. Furthermore, if a statistically relevant differ-ence is discovered, the final causes of this worrying situation will be studied. Official academic results were analyzed. Besides, more than one hundred surveys among students were developed. Results clearly show a deterioration in all indicators for all collectives and students, comparing the performance during the lockdown and the performance of previous years. However, this impact is not homogenous, and results also show how there is, actually, a gender gap placing women in engineering education during the lockdown (an after) in a disadvantaged situation

Mechanism, Occasionalism and Final Causes in Johann Christoph Sturm’s Physics

This paper argues that mechanism, occasionalism and finality (the acceptance of final causes) can be and were de facto integrated into a coherent system of natural philosophy by Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703). Previous scholarship has left the relation between these three elements understudied. According to Sturm, mechanism, occasionalism and finality can count as explanatorily useful elements of natural philosophy, and they might go some way to dealing with the problem of living beings. Occasionalism, in particular, serves a unifying ground: It will be shown that occasionalism can account for the problems of the source and transmission of motion that mechanism faces, while at the same time explaining the finality of non-rational living beings as designed by God.

The Posidonian Argument

*In this chapter I discuss the reception of a design argument by Cicero in the works of Holbach and Voltaire. This argument was directed against both the system of chance and the system of necessity. The chapter distinguishes three interpretations of this argument: (1) a prima facie interpretation; (2) a ‘neglected’ interpretation and (3) a ‘transcendental interpretation.’ It shows that in the early modern period Cicero’s argument was very widely discussed and its significance was not merely as a design argument; it connected scientific practice, even progress in science, to providential final causes. To show this I focus on Boyle and Locke before turning to Newton. In the final section, I return to Voltaire’s response to Holbach and show how Voltaire adapts the argument and uses Newton.

Reasons versus causes in Arocha’s scientific realism

Arocha’s scientific realism (2021) puts at the center of psychology the individual and their variability in behavior: the individual appears to be irreducible to what emerges from the analysis of aggregate data. According to this position, psychology’s aim is to uncover the mechanisms underlying the observable world. This entails adopting the cause-based approach of the natural sciences. Arocha’s article also refers to final causes and intentions and thus to the reason-based approach of the human sciences in contrast to that of the natural sciences. Thus, it is not clear whether the article aims to reduce the final causes to mechanical causes or supports the irreducibility of the former. Starting from these remarks, this comment will argue that the reason-based approach is preferable to the cause-based approach in order to have a scientific psychology. Adopting the reason-based approach also avoids the appeal to aggregate data by focusing upon the single case.

Aristotelian Powers, Mechanism, and Final Causes in the Late Middle Ages

Henrik Lagerlund explores the topic of final causality in the High and later Middle Ages. He argues that the seventeenth-century mechanists weren’t the only ones critiquing and rejecting final causality. There were earlier figures who developed a form of mechanical materialism that eschewed final causes, most notably William of Ockham and John Buridan. Lagerlund begins with the way that Ockham and Buridan in the fourteenth century understood the mereology of the body. Bodily substances were composed of essential parts and integral parts. Essential parts were its metaphysical constituents, its matter and substantial form. Integral parts were its various extended bits. This distinction generated a metaphysical divide between material objects with extended substantial forms and simple, immaterial substances like God, angels, and the human soul. And this divide raises a number of philosophical puzzles for the entities on either side of it. Of special concern to Lagerlund is the numeric identity and unity of material substances across time. Lagerlund shows how Buridan in particular struggled to make sense of the identity and unity of material substances through time. In the end, Buridan could only say that material substances are successively identical through time; they are not totally or partially identical.

“Discourse on Metaphysics”

The “Discourse on Metaphysics” is widely considered to be Leibniz’s most important philosophical work from his so-called “middle period”. Written early in 1686, when Leibniz was 39 years old, it consolidates a number of philosophical ideas that he had developed and sketched out in the years beforehand in a host of short private essays, fragments, and letters. This chapter guides the reader through the key themes of the “Discourse”, such as God’s choice of the best, the nature of substance, final causes, and the relationship between soul and body. The essay concludes with a consideration of what prompted Leibniz to write the “Discourse”; I suggest that the “Discourse” is likely to have been conceived as an attempt to reach supporters of Descartes and Malebranche, not only to challenge key tenets of their respective philosophies but also to present a viable alternative.

Does Berkeley's Immaterialism Support Toland's Spinozism? The Posidonian Argument and the Eleventh Objection

This paper argues that a debate between Toland and Clarke is the intellectual context to help understand the motive behind the critic and the significance of Berkeley's response to the critic in PHK 60-66. These, in turn, are responding to Boyle's adaptation of a neglected design argument by Cicero. The paper shows that there is an intimate connection between these claims of natural science and a once famous design argument. In particular, that in the early modern period the connection between the scientific revolution and a certain commitment to final causes, and god's design, is more than merely contingent. The details of PHK 60-66 support the idea that the critic is responding to concerns that by echoing features of Toland's argument Berkeley undermines the Newtonian edifice Clarke has constructed.

Colloquium 5 Commentary on Gonzalez

This commentary argues that, in contrast to the view of Professor Gonzalez, Aristotle’s account of final causation is not very helpful for addressing contemporary concerns. Aristotle presents it as a type of cause, but, when one considers Aristotle’s distinction between facts and explanations, a final cause is better viewed as simply a fact. It is true that organisms show an internal directedness towards an end, but one can still ask why this is the case. Because of its limitations, Aristotle’s account of final causes is not a third ontological region between materialism and intelligent design, but its lack of explanation leaves it open to attack from either side.