Inner Sense as the Faculty for Inner Receptivity

Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne

According to the inner-sense theory, one finds out about one’s own mind by deploying a (quasi-)perceptual mechanism, or “internal scanner.” The theory defended in TS&K is not a version of the inner-sense theory, but there are commonalities. This chapter examines eight leading objections to the inner-sense theory, and argues that they leave it pretty much unscathed. However, as explained at the end, there are some residual puzzles. Although the inner-sense theory offers a nice explanation of peculiar access, it offers none at all of privileged access. Further, it gives no explanation of why Shoemakerian “self-blindness” does not actually occur. This motivates an examination of some leading alternatives.


KronoScope ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-239
Author(s):  
Rémy Lestienne

Abstract J.T. Fraser used to emphasize the uniqueness of the human brain in its capacity for apprehending the various dimensions of “nootemporality” (Fraser 1982 and 1987). Indeed, our brain allows us to sense the flow of time, to measure delays, to remember past events or to predict future outcomes. In these achievements, the human brain reveals itself far superior to its animal counterpart. Women and men are the only beings, I believe, who are able to think about what they will do the next day. This is because such a thought implies three intellectual abilities that are proper to mankind: the capacity to take their own thoughts as objects of their thinking, the ability of mental time travels—to the past thanks to their episodic memory or to the future—and the possibility to project very far into the future, as a consequence of their enlarged and complexified forebrain. But there are severe limits to our timing abilities of which we are often unaware. Our sensibility to the passing time, like other of our intellectual abilities, is often competing with other brain functions, because they use at least in part the same neural networks. This is particularly the case regarding attention. The deeper the level of attention required, the looser is our perception of the flow of time. When we pay attention to something, when we fix our attention, then our inner sense of the flux of time freezes. This limitation should not sound too unfamiliar to the reader of J.T. Fraser who wrote in his book Time, Conflict, and Human Values (1999) about “time as a nested hierarchy of unresolvable conflicts.”


Anxiety ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 36-76
Author(s):  
Bettina Bergo

Kant’s transcendental revolution temporarily cut through debates between Humian skeptics and rationalists of a Leibniz-Wolffian stripe. It established reason as an immanent tribunal, judging its possibilities and errors. Through an analysis of the structure of intuition and the deduction of the categories intrinsic to judgement, largely scientific, the edifice of the first Critique raised epistemology out of metaphysics and psychologism. Together, the Antimonies and Paralogisms of pure reason indicated the contradictions and misuse of concepts into which rational speculation had hitherto fallen. The paralogisms of the erstwhile rational psychology had argued in favor of the simplicity, substantiality, and the personality of the soul, thereby following a logic of substance and accidents where passions and affects were the latter, attaching to that soul. By showing the errors of the paralogisms, Kant effectively “dispatched” virtually all affects to his “science of man and the world,” the anthropology of human practice. However, the solution to Kant’s Paralogisms of the soul opened a new circle, such that our inner sense and its logical condition, transcendental apperception preceded, but could only be thought thanks to, the categories of understanding. At stake was the intrinsic unity of consciousness within the transcendental project. Although the Critique of Practical Reason retained a crucial intellectual affect, Achtung (attention and respect), Kant’s epistemology required clear distinctions between understanding, reason, and affects. In a sense, ontology and epistemology bifurcate into the domains of a transcendental approach to experience as representation and what lays outside it (including pre-reflective sensibility and affects).


Author(s):  
Dabney Townsend

The German philosopher Baumgarten is known primarily for his introduction of the word ‘aesthetics’ to describe the affects of art and nature, which in the course of the seventeenth century replaced the older theory of beauty. Baumgarten derived the term from the Greek aisthanomai, which he equated with the Latin sentio (1739: 79). He understood it to designate the outer, external or bodily sense, as opposed to the inner sense of consciousness. Thus aesthetics is the realm of the sensate, of sense perception and sensible objects. Baumgarten understood his usage to be consistent with classical sources, but he was aware also that he was extending logic and science into a new realm. Baumgarten’s importance lay in adapting the rationalism of Leibniz for both the study of art and what came to be known after Kant as the aesthetic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (7) ◽  
pp. 956-979
Author(s):  
Thomas Khurana

AbstractThe paper argues that Kant'sdistinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant'saccount interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the realm of theoretical cognition but can be put to work and made productive in terms of practical self-knowledge.


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