New Remarks on the Concept in Logical Use

The main thesis of this paper is directed against the traditional (cognitivetheoretical) definition of the concept which claims that the concept is the '' thought about the essence of the object being thought'', i.e. that it is “a set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object''. But the '' set of essential features or essential characteristics of an object of thought'' is a '' content’’ of the thought. The thought about the essence of an object is definition and the concept is not definition but the part of definition! Besides as the part of formal structure of thought, the concept possesses calculative logical properties that in formal logic (be it syllogistics, or the logic of propositions, or the logic of predicates) come to the front place of formal logical computation. Without the calculative properties of the concept, there would be no calculative properties of propositions which express the thought (thought structures). The calculative properties of a concept include the (1) degree of its logical generality (degree of variability), the (2) logical relations it can establish within the whole of the conceptual content, the (3) operability of the concept in structure of affirmation and negation, the (4) deducibility of either axiomatic or probabilistic systems. Therefore, I believe that, from the logical point of view, the definition of a concept should be applied in favor of its calculative properties that it possesses.

W. QUINE, NATURALIZATION, SKEPTICISM AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE PROBLEM

The paper aims to show the relationship between the W. Alston’s idea about the formal independence of the contexts of “being justified” and of “knowing that one is justified” and the means to overcome the problems of skepticism within the naturalized epistemology by W. Quine. Based on some works – “From a Logical Point of View” (1963), “The Ways of Paradox” (1966), “Ontological Relativity” (1969) etc. – an attempt is made to reconstruct close to the text the possible answers that W. Quine may give to the skeptical challenge of the problem of justification of standards of justification and of the “conceptual change” problem. It is shown that W. Quine's response to the skeptical “challenge to natural science that arises from within natural science” can be understood as a reference of the independence of different “epistemic levels”, one of which is set by the “background” theory that provides the understanding of terms such “reality”, “evidence” and “justification”, and the other is related to the search for a more effective representation of the theory and determines the possibility of its change.

Scientific and theoretical bases for the motivation efficiency of children's socialization in the learning process

A teacher who knows the type of motivation can create the conditions to reinforce the appropriate positive motivation. If this is a motivation related to the outcome of the training, the conditions for its support, promotion, demonstration of the usefulness of the acquired knowledge for the future can be the creation of a positive public opinion. If this motivation is the motivation related to the purpose of learning, then the conditions for its support can be the information about the results obtained, the emergence and formation of cognitive interests, the problematic methodology. To support the motivation associated with the learning process, there is a need for a lively and entertaining structure of the learning process, student’s activity and independence, research methodology and the creation of conditions for the manifestation of their skills. The article puts forward ideas about the main features of the modern lesson, which contributes to the socialization of the student's personality, and explains in detail the forms of organization of the modern lesson. In addition, the stages of the modern lesson and the organization of students’ activity in these stages were noted. The main focus is on the problem of directing the socialization of the student's personality. It addresses the issues of meeting the needs of students in the organization of pedagogical work in the modern classroom, as well as the creation of a system of interaction in the student body. The need for individual application of programs aimed at promoting the personal position of the student stems from the fact that in this context, a fertile socio-pedagogical basis for the individual integration of knowledge of each student is formed. It should be noted that such an approach to pedagogical work leads to sustainable prospects in education. The purpose of the article is also to link the content elements of education and the individual stages of the lesson structure on a pedagogical-psychological basis from a socio-logical point of view. The article also provides extensive scientific approaches and practical examples of the ways aimed at the improving the quality of education.

Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems

In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.

Reasoning with Ambiguity

We treat the problem of reasoning with ambiguous propositions. Even though ambiguity is obviously problematic for reasoning, it is no less obvious that ambiguous propositions entail other propositions (both ambiguous and unambiguous), and are entailed by other propositions. This article gives a formal analysis of the underlying mechanisms, both from an algebraic and a logical point of view. The main result can be summarized as follows: sound (and complete) reasoning with ambiguity requires a distinction between equivalence on the one and congruence on the other side: the fact that $$\alpha $$ α entails $$\beta $$ β does not imply $$\beta $$ β can be substituted for $$\alpha $$ α in all contexts preserving truth. Without this distinction, we will always run into paradoxical results. We present the (cut-free) sequent calculus $$\mathsf {AL}^{\textit{cf}}$$ AL cf , which we conjecture implements sound and complete propositional reasoning with ambiguity, and provide it with a language-theoretic semantics, where letters represent unambiguous meanings and concatenation represents ambiguity.

LIBERTARIAN PHILOSOPHY VERSUS PROPERTARIAN DOGMA: A FURTHER REPLY TO BLOCK

This replies to Block 2019 (B19), which responds to Lester 2014 (L14). The main issues in the, varyingly sized, sections are as follows. 1 Further explanations of critical rationalism, the theory of liberty, and problems with the non-aggression principle. 2.1 The relationships among law, morality, and libertarianism. 2.2 The objective invasiveness of low-level radiation and that it is, therefore, a proactive imposition (albeit trivial) if someone inflicts it on non-consenting people. 2.3 The objective and subjective aspects of proactive impositions; and how clashes can be resolved. 2.4 How liberty relates to risk and self-ownership. 2.5 Libertarian initial acquisition versus absolute property rights by labour-mixing. 2.6 Organisational note. 2.7 Libertarianism and mens rea. 2.8 Libertarian rectification versus lex-talionis doubling. 2.9 Indirectly clashing rights, self-preservation, trespasser-hiker, flagpole-grasper, and landmine-layer. 2.10 A logical point is not a moral point. 2.11 Pacifism and libertarianism. 3.1 A weak criticism of utilitarianism. 3.2 Hedonometers; approximate interpersonal comparisons of utility imply libertarianism; what a libertarian is; libertarian rankings. 4. Libertarian philosophy versus propertarian dogma. Coda: the need to take seriously the philosophical problems with propertarian-justificationist libertarianism. Readers that might be interested include those engaging in libertarian philosophy and those using the Rothbardian/Blockian theoretical approach to libertarianism.

Augmented Reality and Its Relationship With Customer Experience in Retailing

Today, traditional retailers have been faced with tough competition mainly because of the internet and online shopping. There is no doubt that online shopping is increasing all around the world, even in the developing countries. Although it is said that internet has a pressure on companies to decrease their price, up to date studies showed the opposite way. In other words, people do not buy from the internet because of just low price; branding is still the most important criteria for people. Because of this, companies have started making investment on digital branding. Of course, the logical point behind the branding is still same, but the tools they use to create high brand equity are different. With the help of technology, firms, especially those who have online selling via their websites, generate different vehicles to differentiate their selves from competitors, and give their customers a unique online experience. One of the vehicles that they use nowadays is augmented reality.

How Can Semantics Avoid the Troubles with the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction?

At least since Quine (From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953) it has been suspected that a semantic theory that rests on defining features, or on what are taken to be “analytic” properties bearing on the content of lexical items, rests on a fault line. Simply put, there is no criterion for determining which features or propertiesFeatures are to be analytic and which ones are to be synthetic or contingent on experience. Deep down, our concern is what cognitive science and its several competing semantic theories have to offer in terms of solution. We analyze a few cases, which run into trouble by appealing to analyticity, and propose our own solution to this problem: a version of atomism cum inferences, which we think it is the only way out of the dead-end of analyticity. We start off by discussing several guiding assumptions regarding cognitive architecture and on what we take to be methodological imperatives for doing semantics within cognitive science—that is a semantics that is concerned with accounting for mental states. We then discuss theoretical perspectives on lexical causatives and the so-called “coercion” phenomenon or, in our preferred terminology, indeterminacy. And we advance, even if briefly, a proposal for the representation and processing of conceptual content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction. We argue that the only account of mental content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction is atomism. The version of atomism that we sketch accounts for the purported effects of analyticity with a system of inferences that are in essence synthetic and, thus, not content constitutive.