PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PEDAGOGICAL SUPPORT OF THE ELDERLY AS A FACTOR OF SUCCESSFUL AGING

Statement of the problem. Globally aging populations, with the number of elderly people growing at a faster rate than other population groups, are increasing their share of the total population in virtually all countries. Knowledge of the needs of elderly people is necessary to determine the optimal forms of work with them and the choice of those types of social services that they need especially. In senior age, the occurring personality modification is characterized by a diverse set of qualities that are rarely found in one person. Therefore, there is a need to consider the approaches of psychological and pedagogical support and those factors that affect the lifestyle of people in advanced age and successful aging. Materials and methods include the principle of a systematic approach and methodological unity of the biological and psychosocial in the formation of human mental pathology (B.G. Ananiev; B.F. Lomov; M.M. Kabanov; Yu.L. Nuller; V.M. Vorobiev; L.I. Wasserman); the principle of determinism, the principle of the unity of consciousness and activity (S.L. Rubinstein; A.N. Leontiev); the principle of system approach (V.A. Ganzen). There were also theoretical and methodological foundations of the concept by Russian psychologists G.S. Abramova, E.F. Rybalko and M.D. Aleksandrova, as well as fundamental methodological provisions on the unity of consciousness and activity, on the development of psyche in activity (L.S. Vygotsky, A.N. Leontiev, S.L. Rubinstein, etc.). Research results. Theoretical and experimental research systematized the conditions and factors that predetermine successful aging and the targets of preventive work. The presented research results make it possible to increase the effectiveness of complex measures aimed at increasing the proportion of successful aging. The studies have identified the factors that determine successful aging and the targets of prevention work. Successful aging is multifaceted and includes preventing disease and disability, maintaining high physical and cognitive functions, and constant participation in social and industrial activities. Conclusion. The presented research results will supplement the data on psychological and pedagogical support of the elderly and create prerequisites for the development of effective comprehensive measures aimed at increasing the proportion of successful aging.

Model Unity and the Unity of Consciousness: Developments in Expected Float Entropy Minimisation

The unity of consciousness, or, more precisely, phenomenal unity, is an important property of consciousness and an important area of research in mathematical consciousness science and the scientific study of consciousness. Due to the numerous aspects and complexity of consciousness, the property tends to engender loose or inadequate characterizations. In this article, we introduce the concept and mathematical formulation of model unity. A system has model unity if a single relational model, stretched across the whole system, is optimal. Alternatively, model unity may only be present for subsystems, although there may still be unity at some higher level. As a development in the theory of expected float entropy minimisation, such relational models provide an interpretation of system states and the theory may help to provide insights into questions such as why experience of the visual field is unified and why different people do not have a unified consciousness, for example. This article constitutes a relatively small initial study of model unity. Four investigations were undertaken and are given as examples. A postulate is also given, distilling the foundations of EFE minimisation into a clear statement allowing others to consider whether or not the postulate identifies a self-evident fundamental property of consciousness.

The number is — nothing personal! — the intimasy of the gullotine

The unfolded by us in the pressconcept of “Trojan terrorism” testifies that the Idea, having acquired the Image of the Сoncept: capture as a formality, owns society as a sovereign, establishing its Principle, demonstrating not only quasi and ultra anarchic freedom of will (as dogma and credo) of everyone, but also quite Martian chronicles of existence in every state on the planet, wills and completely the Martian chronicles of existence, relying on the 'multiple unity' of Consciousness in the context of total human (humanistic) impoverishment.

The New Philosophy

Kant’s transcendental revolution temporarily cut through debates between Humian skeptics and rationalists of a Leibniz-Wolffian stripe. It established reason as an immanent tribunal, judging its possibilities and errors. Through an analysis of the structure of intuition and the deduction of the categories intrinsic to judgement, largely scientific, the edifice of the first Critique raised epistemology out of metaphysics and psychologism. Together, the Antimonies and Paralogisms of pure reason indicated the contradictions and misuse of concepts into which rational speculation had hitherto fallen. The paralogisms of the erstwhile rational psychology had argued in favor of the simplicity, substantiality, and the personality of the soul, thereby following a logic of substance and accidents where passions and affects were the latter, attaching to that soul. By showing the errors of the paralogisms, Kant effectively “dispatched” virtually all affects to his “science of man and the world,” the anthropology of human practice. However, the solution to Kant’s Paralogisms of the soul opened a new circle, such that our inner sense and its logical condition, transcendental apperception preceded, but could only be thought thanks to, the categories of understanding. At stake was the intrinsic unity of consciousness within the transcendental project. Although the Critique of Practical Reason retained a crucial intellectual affect, Achtung (attention and respect), Kant’s epistemology required clear distinctions between understanding, reason, and affects. In a sense, ontology and epistemology bifurcate into the domains of a transcendental approach to experience as representation and what lays outside it (including pre-reflective sensibility and affects).

Self-Consciousness as a Living Kind: On the Fourth Chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology

This paper discusses Hegel's conception of self-consciousness in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It argues that Hegel articulates self-consciousness as a living being's capacity to conceive of itself in light of the life-form it instantiates. I start by critically reassessing the prevalent readings of the Self-Consciousness chapter, each of which focuses on one of three constitutive aspects of self-consciousness: sociality, corporeality or practicality. Second, I reconstruct how the opening of the chapter aims to reveal that the initial rift between the sensory and the conceptual capacities of consciousness is resolved by the unity of consciousness as a life-form. Third, I discuss the specification of this life-form as Geist and argue that, by introducing the notion of Geist, Hegel indicates that the generic capacity of the human being to conceive of itself in light of its life-form always particularizes itself in a conception of human life that determines a historic and social form of life. Fourth, I outline how the master-slave dialectic illustrates the interdependency between sensory and conceptual capacities. Hegel's tale undermines the assumption of a self-contained capacity for reason by displaying how conceptual capacities, actualized by a living being, rely from the outset on objective constraints. I conclude by contending that the Self-Consciousness chapter paves the way for the central role that the idea of life plays in the Logic in exemplifying the objectivity of the concept.

The Multiplicity of I

If in heteronymic simulation I am a subject other than the subject I am, there are evidently as many other I’s as there are possible acts of simulation. Pessoa, inhabiting countless lives, says that by creating in imagination a multiplicity of virtual subjects, each of which is him, he has ‘ubiquitized’ himself. So he affirms a thesis I will call ‘Subject Plurality’: I am many subjects other than the subject I am. We need, though, to distinguish two versions of this thesis, for it can be read as making either a diachronic claim or a synchronic one. Interpreters of Pessoa have been drawn to present the Pessoan self as a sort of parliament or confederation of souls. Despite Pessoa’s appeal, once, to the metaphor of a colony—and there only in connection with the phenomenal unity of consciousness rather than with reference to the multiplicity of heteronyms—the ‘confederation’ theory is not Pessoa’s. It is a Proustian, not a Pessoan, picture of multiplicity. An appreciation of this distinction is crucial to seeing why Pessoa’s multiplicity of I is not reducible to another mental illness, multiple personality disorder. The distinction between successive and simultaneous subject plurality has found a surprising application: understanding Afrofuturism’s experimentation with multiple sonic selves.

Forms of Worldview and Specifics of Philosophy

This article raises the problem of the constancy of philosophy, science, art, religion, and politics as forms of worldview that characterize the state of post-mythological consciousness. In this regard, two tasks are solved. First, we trace the genesis of worldview forms in German classical thought in the context of substantiating the idea of the historicity of the absolute (G. Hegel and F. Schelling). Second, the question is raised about the specifics of philosophy as a form of thinking. The authors compare classical and nonclassical approaches (A. Badiou) to solving problems, the conclusions, they have made, are the following. In modern theories, there is a blurring and loss of objectivity of philosophical knowledge. Despite this, philosophy is invariably given the role of a way of thinking about its time. The classical claims of philosophy to the universal content of truth are canceled. Based on the analysis of the concept of A. Badiou, the specificity of philosophy is revealed in the ability to quickly arrange science, art, religion and politics – as a way to create an ideal space in which access to the event of truth is provided. In this connection, it is proposed to define this concept as “operational” in relation to the nature of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy as a reflexive ability uses the operative time of our consciousness, which constitutes subjectivity. Destroying the mytho-ritual scheme of the unity of consciousness, philosophy sets the spiritual topos in which a person lives after leaving the myth.

The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness

Philosophical interest in unity of consciousness goes back at least to Kant. A recent revival of interest among analytic philosophers of mind focuses on unity of consciousness, construed as phenomenal unity. This chapter will survey some of the issues and questions that have been central to this recent work before sketching an alternative to what may be seen as a dominant, though implicit, tendency in the recent literature on unity: to formulate the idea that phenomenal unity is a natural feature of consciousness in terms of what the chapter will term the Unity Thesis. According to this thesis, all synchronous experiences of a conscious subject at a moment are phenomenally unified with each other. The chapter then rebuts another trend in recent literature: the tendency to understand phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of a type of oneness or singularity. The chapter advances an alternative that sees phenomenal unity as obtaining in virtue of connectivity conditions over relations among phenomenal experiences.